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ABSTRACT 
Constitutional orders punish—and they punish abundantly. However, 
analysis of the constitutionality of punishment tends to be reactive, 
focusing on constitutional violations. Considered in this light, the 
approach to constitutional punishment rests on conditions of 
unconstitutionality rather than proactively on the constitutional 
foundations of punishment as a legitimate liberal-democratic practice. 
Reactive approaches are predominantly informed by moral theories about 
the conditions under which punishment is legitimate. In contrast, proactive 
approaches call for a political theory of punishment as a legitimate 
practice of polities. This Article integrates the reactive and proactive 
approaches by bridging the divide between moral and political theories of 
punishment.  
Using the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court as 
representative of a global trend in constitutional punishment doctrine, this 
Article engages details of case law to show how the integration of reactive 
and proactive approaches might work. The differences between the two 
approaches and the theories that inform them may seem too subtle to 
matter. They stand, however, across a large constitutional space, and their 
differences translate into important doctrinal, normative, and practical 
consequences. Nonetheless, despite the differences between these 
competing approaches, this Article contends that their integration in the 
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articulation of the foundations of punishment as a legitimate constitutional 
practice are well within the reach of existing constitutional doctrines in 
liberal democracies and beyond.  
The Article argues that constitutional punishment ought to rest upon 
five principles. First, constitutional orders must take constitutional 
ownership of punishment as coerced vulnerability created and imposed by 
such orders. Second, state violence in the form of punishment must be 
conceived and designed as cruelty-free, and practiced under this regulative 
ideal. Third, respect for individuals as the embodiment of dignity must be 
actively affirmed through, rather than simply not violated by, punishment. 
Fourth, this affirmation of human dignity through punishment entails that 
punishment must meet morally justified penological objectives and take 
seriously the moral agency of those subject to it. Finally, punishment that 
fails the above conditions must be fully redressable and adequate 
preventative remedies must be available and accessible. If doctrine is 
reformed just enough to rest on these principles, the necessary conditions 
of legitimate constitutional punishment would be met.  
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INTRODUCTION 
A. The Problem 
Constitutions are supposed to constitute legal and political orders. Once 
such an order has been established, whatever its specific characteristics, 
the problem becomes how to maintain and reproduce the order over time. 
Here constitutionalism—the complex process of constitutional 
conservation, adaptation, and reproduction of legal and political orders—
steps in. The tasks of constitutionalism universally implicate violence: 
constitutional orders repress some forms of violence while creating or 
perpetuating others, the expression and deployment of which the 
constitutional orders regulate.
1
  
Of all forms of constitutional violence, none is more commonly 
deployed than punishment for criminal offenses. Perhaps no other has 
historically been more necessary. From time immemorial, societies have 
looked to the imposition of punishment to promote their most cherished 
values and to protect those societies from the dangers they fear most. And 
modern societies depend upon constitutional punishment as much as pre-
modern ones depended on repressive royal, religious, and social sanctions.  
 
 
 1. That violence is implicated in the constitution and reproduction of social orders has been 
recognized throughout the ages. For examples across different intellectual traditions, see THUCYDIDES, 
HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (Rex Warner trans., Penguin Books rev. ed. 1972); THOMAS 
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996). For a rigorous and insightful 
discussion of punishment that starts with Hobbes, see generally Alice Ristroph, Respect and 
Resistance in Punishment Theory, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 601 (2009); WALTER BENJAMIN, Critique of 
Violence, in REFLECTIONS: ESSAYS, APHORISMS, AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL WRITINGS 277 (Edmund 
Jephcott trans., 1978); HANNAH ARENDT, ON VIOLENCE (1970); Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: “The 
Mystical Foundation of Authority”, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 920 (1990); and, more recently, DOUGLASS 
C. NORTH, JOHN JOSEPH WALLIS & BARRY R. WEINGAST, VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL ORDERS: A 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTERPRETING RECORDED HUMAN HISTORY (2009).  
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So powerful are the need and will of constitutional orders to punish that 
individuals facing the criminal law invariably find their constitutional 
rights—including in some cases the right to life—at stake in the process. 
When we consider all of the factors—legitimate and spurious—that lead to 
conviction, criminal law emerges as the arena where social misfortune, 
biological chance, blameworthy aspects of character and will all face off 
with the unrivaled power of legal and political orders.
2
 But despite the 
inherent imperfections of such a process—and herein lies the problem this 
Article addresses—if constitutional orders are to be legitimate, at least 
some kinds of punishment must also be legitimate. Importantly, in this 
context, punishment is not just something constitutional orders inflict on 
the criminally liable; punishment is something constitutional orders do to 
themselves. How and why a constitutional order imposes punishment is a 
key determinant of its character. Historically, no type of constitutional 
order has raised the bar of legitimate punishment higher than the liberal 
democratic type where citizens are engaged in self-government.
3
 And yet, 
liberal democratic constitutional orders punish—and they punish 
abundantly. Despite this fact, such orders only partially and reluctantly 
take ownership of punishment. They only look at punishment indirectly, 
concerned with its outer limits rather than with the conditions under which 
they could own punishment as one of the central institutions of modern 
constitutionalism.  
This traditional approach—focusing on criteria for constitutionally 
impermissible punishment—is attractive for two main reasons. First, the 
focus on the outer limits of punishment draws considerable traction from 
the cultural aversion of liberal democracies to punitive practices. 
Punishment is inherently violent, and liberal democratic sensibilities reject 
violence, at least violence close to home. Second, this reactive approach to 
punishment follows a path of doctrinal argument untrammeled by deeper 
questions of law, politics, and morality, thus posing only limited 
challenges to broader issues of social justice.  
On this second point, American constitutional law is paradigmatic. The 
United States Constitution gives legislatures and administrations 
considerable latitude in deciding what and how to punish. However (the 
 
 
 2. No modern thinker fully understood this collision before Hegel. See G.W.F. HEGEL, 
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T.M. Knox trans., 2000). Alan Norrie does justice to this aspect of Hegel’s 
philosophy of law in his book, ALAN NORRIE, LAW, IDEOLOGY AND PUNISHMENT: RETRIEVAL AND 
CRITIQUE OF THE LIBERAL IDEAL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1991). 
 3. For a sophisticated and illuminating study of self-governance through constitutionalism, see 
Vlad Perju, Cosmopolitanism and Constitutional Self-Government, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 326 (2010). 
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reactive approach quickly adds) the powers to criminalize and punish are 
not unlimited. The precise boundaries the Constitution sets for punishment 
then become the central question, one usually answered by reference to 
due process and Eighth Amendment violations. 
This type of reactive approach certainly has a place in the 
constitutional theory of punishment. But it is insufficient in fatal ways. In 
fact, the reactive take on punishment is behind many of the injustices and 
dysfunctionalities that plague liberal democratic punishment. These issues 
will never be satisfactorily addressed until liberal democratic constitutions 
take on the problem of articulating the principles that would give 
punishment a legitimate place at the center of their constitutional stage—a 
problem that requires a proactive approach.  
Rather than discard the reactive approach altogether, this Article 
proposes an approach to this problem that brings together the traditional 
reactive concern with the limits of punishment and a new proactive search 
for foundations. In the process, it integrates the political and moral 
theories of constitutional punishment. The differences this new approach 
makes may seem too subtle to matter. However, below the surface, the 
integrative approach has significant doctrinal, normative, and practical 
consequences, as I shall show. Ultimately, this integration offers the best 
hope for rescuing constitutional punishment from the depths to which it 
has sunk under the reactive approach.  
B. Nature of the Argument 
This Article is long and dense, in an attempt to do justice to the 
problem it faces. In Part I, legal theory engages the concrete details of case 
law using American constitutional doctrine as an example of a global 
fixation with reactive approaches to punishment.
4
 The traditional approach 
 
 
 4. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Brown v. Plata, 131 S.Ct. 1910 (2011). Cases 
involving prison conditions in light of the right against cruel punishment have received comparatively 
little attention in the literature. This list of relevant cases can be taken as a good starting point for 
research in this area of the law: Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 
730 (2002); Hope v. Pelzer, 240 F.3d 975 (11th Cir. 2001); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); 
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993); Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1 (1992); Wilson v. Seiter, 
501 U.S. 294 (1991); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 
(1981); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Estelle v. 
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (recognizing deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners 
constitutes the unnecessary and uncertain infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment); 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). More recently, Baze 
v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008), reaffirmed the “sure or very likely to cause . . . needless suffering” 
standard of Helling, 509 U.S. at 33, and the “substantial risk of serious harm” standard of Farmer, 511 
U.S. at 842, when assessing risk of future harm that could constitute cruel punishment. Always 
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to punishment taken in these cases has serious limitations, particularly in 
the ways it defines punishment, cruelty, and rights. I shall argue, however, 
that these cases rest upon premises that provide the basis for arriving at 
principles that can establish punishment as a legitimate constitutional 
practice.  
Part II takes a proactive, reconstructive approach to constitutional 
punishment, redefining punishment, cruelty, and right in light of five 
principles of legitimate constitutional punishment.
5
  
At the beginning of this section, I propose a set of integrative 
principles that are necessary, but almost certainly not sufficient, for 
punishment to earn its place at the center of the constitutional stage 
alongside other pillars of liberal-democratic constitutions such as term 
limits and elections, separation and limitation of powers, justiciable rights, 
and judicial review.  
The integrative principles are the following: First, constitutional orders 
must take ownership of punishment as coerced vulnerability created and 
imposed by them. Second, state violence in the form of punishment must 
be cruelty-free, both as conceived and as practiced. Third, punishment 
must proactively affirm, rather than simply refrain from violating, respect 
for each person as a free and equal embodiment of human dignity. Fourth, 
the affirmation of human dignity through punishment entails that 
punishment must both meet morally justified penological objectives and to 
take seriously the moral agency of those subject to it. Finally, punishment 
 
 
important for anyone interested in public law remedies for institutional harm is Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 
F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala 1971), 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 
1972), sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). The European Court of Human 
Rights has also confronted the problem. See Saadi v. Italy, 37201 Eur. Ct. H.R. 06 (2008); Devrim 
Turan v. Turkey, 897 Eur. Ct. H.R. 02 (2006); Rohde v. Denmark, 69332 Eur. Ct. H.R. 01 (2005); 
Bekos and Koutropoulos v. Greece, 15250 Eur. Ct. H.R. 02 (2005); Mouisel v. France, 67263 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 01 (2002); Valasinas v. Lithuania, 4458 Eur. Ct. H.R. 98 (2001); Peers v. Greece, 28584 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 95 (2001); Dougoz v. Greece, 40907 Eur. Ct. H.R. 98 (2001); Kudla v. Poland, 30210 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 96 (2000); Labita v Italy, 26772 Eur. Ct. H.R. 95 (2000); V. v. United Kingdom, 24888 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 94 (1999); T. v. United Kingdom, 24724 Eur. Ct. H.R. 94 (1999); Erdagoz v. Turkey, 127 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 945/746 (1997); Vilvarajah et al. v. United Kingdom, 13163 Eur. Ct. H.R. 87 (1991); Ireland 
v. United Kingdom, 5310 Eur. Ct. H.R. 71 (1978). Other relevant domestic and international judicial 
pronouncements are mentioned throughout this Article. 
 5. The argument here may be seen either as one that starts from within existing doctrines in 
order to push them out of their conceptual limitations, or as one that seeks to achieve a reflective 
equilibrium between existing doctrines and a set of exogenous principles designed to, over time, bend 
the existing doctrines to conform to those principles as their content continues to be worked out in the 
process. Either way, this Article’s theoretical intervention remains stubbornly close to existing 
doctrines. Roberto Unger has characterized such an approach to legal analysis as “deviationist 
doctrine.” See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 15, 88–90 
(1986).  
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that fails to meet the above conditions must be fully redressable, and 
adequate preventative remedies must be available and accessible to all. If 
constitutional orders were reformed just enough to reflect these principles, 
constitutional punishment would find its proper place in constitutionalism.  
C. Integrating Moral and Political Theory 
The importance of integrating moral and political theories of 
punishment—a key feature of my approach—will not be obvious to all 
readers. In connection with his constitutional theory of punishment, Alan 
Brudner writes that “a constitutional theory of the penal law’s general part 
provides a more unified and ethically satisfying picture of it than any 
version of a moral theory.”6 The reason for this explanatory superiority, he 
explains, is that: 
Whereas a moral theory sees the penal law’s general part as 
embodying the principle that moral evil and only moral evil ought 
to be blamed and censured, a constitutional theory sees it as 
reconciling state coercion with the agent’s inviolability. The best 
theory of the penal law’s general part . . . is a theory about when it 
is permissible for the state to coerce a free agent, not a theory about 
when it is appropriate for a community to blame and censure a 
member’s moral character.7  
Such a focus on the political and constitutional theory of punishment is 
helpful but incomplete, and also too far removed from existing 
constitutional doctrine. In American criminal law, for example, the 
conditions for the infliction of punishment must be tied to rationally 
defensible penological objectives if such punishment is to pass 
constitutional muster.
8
 Because these objectives are subject to moral 
evaluation, if a reconstruction of constitutional punishment is to gain any 
traction in actual doctrine, the inquiry into the political theory of 
punishment must connect with the moral inquiry. Ultimately, coherence 
and intelligibility demand that both inquiries be integrated in a search for 
the moral as well as the political principles upon which legitimate 
 
 
 6. ALAN BRUDNER, PUNISHMENT AND FREEDOM: A LIBERAL THEORY OF PENAL JUSTICE 325 
(2009). Professor Brudner writes in the criminal law philosophy tradition of Kant and Hegel. See 
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE (John Ladd trans., 1965) (1797) 
[hereinafter KANT, JUSTICE]; HEGEL, supra note 2. 
 7. BRUDNER, supra note 6, at 325–26. 
 8. E.g., United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 600 (9th Cir. 2004).    
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constitutional orders may take ownership of punishment as a legitimate, 
routine constitutional practice.  
Easier said than done, of course. Punishment by definition entails 
prima facie violatons of rights to individual liberty, social status, bodily 
integrity, property, and even life. These prima facie violations raise a 
significant first order obstacle to punishment as a routine constitutional 
practice. As a consequence, even after reaching an affirmative answer to 
the first order question of whether punishment is constitutional,
9
 the 
second order question remains as to how to use constitutional punishment. 
Whereas the first order question is one of political theory of the 
constitution, the second order question pertains to the morality of means 
and ends of punishment as practiced in a given polity. All too often, 
theories of punishment fail to speak to both questions in an integrating 
architectonic. And yet, without an integrative paradigm, one that rests 
punishment on constitutional as well as on moral theory, we cannot fully 
articulate the foundations and reach of constitutional punishment as a 
practice consistent with the freedom, equality, and dignity of self-
governing citizens. 
I am certainly not alone in the search for an integrative paradigm. 
Starting with the first social contract theories, legal and political theorists 
have searched for the conditions upon which constitutional orders may 
legitimately engage in punishment.
10
 Much more recently, Jeffrie Murphy 
 
 
     9.  Some have argued that societies would be better off without punishment. See, e.g., DEIRDRE 
GOLASH, THE CASE AGAINST PUNISHMENT: RETRIBUTION, CRIME PREVENTION, AND THE LAW 
(2006). 
 10. For scholarship bearing on the all-important inquiry into the political-constitutional and 
moral theories of criminal law and punishment, among others cited throughout, see generally Markus 
D. Dubber, Legitimating Penal Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2597 (2007); GLANVILLE L. WILLIAMS, 
CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART (1953); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 
(2000); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, AND 
INTERNATIONAL (2007); NICOLA LACEY, STATE PUNISHMENT: POLITICAL PRINCIPLES AND 
COMMUNITY VALUES (1988); David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 YALE J. INT’L 
L. 85 (2004); David Luban, Hannah Arendt as a Theorist of International Criminal Law, 11 INT’L 
CRIM. L. REV. 621 (2011); DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN 
AN AGE OF ABOLITION (2010); Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115 
(2007); Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 359 (2005); 
John Gardner, On the General Part of the Criminal Law, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 205 
(Antony Duff ed., 1998); ALAN NORRIE, PUNISHMENT, RESPONSIBILITY, AND JUSTICE: A RELATIONAL 
CRITIQUE (2000); JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING 
DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003); LINDSAY FARMER, CRIMINAL LAW, TRADITION AND 
LEGAL ORDER: CRIME AND THE GENIUS OF SCOTS LAW¸ 1747 TO THE PRESENT (1997); Carol S. 
Steiker, Capital Punishment and American Exceptionalism, 81 OR. L. REV. 97 (2002); CRIMINAL LAW 
THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART (Stephen Shute & A. P. Simester eds., 2002); 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW (R.A. Duff & Staurt P. Green eds., 2011); PAUL W. 
KAHN, SACRED VIOLENCE: TORTURE, TERROR, AND SOVEREIGNTY (2008); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, 
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has argued that a morally “retributive theory [of punishment] really 
presupposes what might be called a ‘gentlemen’s club’ picture of the 
political relation between man and society . . . .”11 How then, Murphy 
asked, are we to reform our retributive practices in line with the social 
realities of poverty, alienation, prejudice, and structural duress?  
[W]e may really be forced seriously to consider a radical proposal. 
If we think that institutions of punishment are necessary and 
desirable, and if we are morally sensitive enough to want to be sure 
that we have the moral right to punish before we inflict it, then we 
had better first make sure that we have restructured society in such a 
way that criminals genuinely do correspond to the only model that 
will render punishment permissible—i.e., make sure that they are 
autonomous and that they do benefit in the requisite sense.
12
  
In another compelling intervention, Alice Ristroph has argued that 
“[e]very crime is a collective endeavor.”13 If a polity were really to take 
responsibility for its criminal law as an enterprise of the political 
community, it  
might scrutinize the accusations it makes and the acts it 
criminalizes. Even if the polity were satisfied that the bounds of its 
substantive criminal law were properly drawn, it would then 
examine the extent to which social and political conditions within 
its control contributed to the commission of . . . crimes. And even if 
the polity were satisfied that it had defined the criminal law fairly 
and secured a just social order, it would also have to consider the 
political and social consequences of its responses to criminal acts. If 
its penal policies caused significant harm to individuals and 
communities, a responsible polity would not dismiss such harms as 
collateral consequences to justified violence. It would seek to 
address those harms, to mitigate them, perhaps to compensate for 
 
 
Harm and Its Moral Significance, LEGAL THEORY 18, Special Issue 03 (2012); LARRY MAY, CRIMES 
AGAINST HUMANITY: A NORMATIVE ACCOUNT (2005); Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 
1421 (2004); JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1990). 
 11. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 217, 240 (1973). Contra 
HERBERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY AND MORAL 
PSYCHOLOGY (1976). 
 12. Murphy, supra note 11, at 243. 
 13. Alice Ristroph, Responsibility for the Criminal Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
CRIMINAL LAW 107 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011). 
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them. Such scrutiny and remedial action would be difficult, but that 
is what it means to take responsibility.
14
  
Murphy’s and Ristroph’s views are as morally and politically persuasive 
as, regrettably, they are ideologically distant from the long and intricate 
constitutional jurisprudence on crime and punishment in liberal 
democracies around the world, notably in the United States.
15
 In contrast, 
the integrative paradigm I propose calls for constructive doctrinal 
reorientation rather than radical doctrinal creation. Using the example of 
American constitutional law, this Article builds on doctrinal elements 
already present in national courts’ constitutional jurisprudence. The 
paradigm it proposes casts these elements in the new light of conceptual 
therapy and reconstruction under the shaping inflection of regulative 
principles. Its proximity to existing doctrine makes the new reconstructive 
paradigm more likely to find acceptance than those paradigms that suggest 
an approach that is more foreign to existing law. 
An additional reason for flying close to the ground of existing doctrine 
is that in the context of American politics and, increasingly, around the 
world, the judiciary is the most promising agent of reasoned reform in 
many areas of social progress. Observers of this phenomenon often argue 
that the democratic pedigree of the judiciary is inferior to that of elected 
representatives.
16
 In this Article, I leave aside the question of whether that 
is or is not the case. The focus here is upon one characteristic shared by 
both judicial and legislative law: both begin with choice. In their work on 
judicial policymaking, Malcolm Feeley and Edward Rubin distinguish 
judicial interpretation from judicial policymaking.
17
 Whereas 
 
 
 14. Id. at 124. Interestingly, Brazil has taken leadership in providing financial support to 
qualifying families of the incarcerated. Still, in that country, Congress is currently debating a 
legislative initiative to stipulate and guarantee the right of minors to have meaningful regular contact 
with their incarcerated parents. 
 15. I have contributed to the type of structural criticism and reconstruction defended by Murphy 
and Ristroph. See Paulo Barrozo, Punishing Cruelly: Punishment, Cruelty and Mercy, 2 CRIM. L. & 
PHIL. 67 (2008) [hereinafter Barrozo, Punishing Cruelly]; Paulo Barrozo, The Jurisprudence of 
Cruelty in Criminal Law (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=1916910 [hereinafter Barrozo, Jurisprudence of Cruelty].  
 16. E.g., ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? (1996); 
JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION (1999). 
 17. MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN 
STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 1–13 (1998). Empirical studies have 
confirmed that the discourse of “judicial restraint” is often just that. Indeed, surveying 842 Supreme 
Court cases between 1977 and 2003, Bailey and Maltzman found that Justices Thomas, Scalia, and 
Kennedy were the least deferential to Congress in the twenty-six year period covered by the study. See 
Michael A. Bailey & Forrest Maltzman, Does Legal Doctrine Matter? Unpacking Law and Policy 
Preferences on the U.S. Supreme Court, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 369 (2008). A related matter is 
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interpretation appeals to authoritative sources as a guide to the substance 
of judicial decisions, judicial policymaking appeals to law only as a source 
for courts’ jurisdiction to exercise policy authority over a discrete subject-
matter domain. For example, and according to this distinction, in their 
sustained efforts to reform prisons beginning in the mid-1960s, American 
federal courts used the Eighth Amendment “not as a source of standards, 
but as a basis for judicial jurisdiction.”18 Once the federal courts 
established their Eighth Amendment jurisdiction over federal, state and 
local punishment, they designed interventionist policies derived from 
“correctional literature, sociology, and their own perceptions of political 
morality.”19  
The sweeping policy intervention of federal courts lost momentum in 
the 80s and has since suffered severe backlash from American courts, 
starting with the Supreme Court. Of even greater consequence to the future 
of constitutional punishment in the United States is that this intervention 
failed to leave behind a doctrinal structure consistently codifying the 
moral and political impulses behind the reforms, leaving unparented the 
work of courts in the reformist era. In other words, policy choices made by 
federal courts during the interventionist phase never matured into a fully 
developed doctrine of the foundations of legitimate constitutional 
punishment: they never went beyond the reactive fixation with criteria of 
constitutional violation.  
Recently, the Supreme Court has revisited the problem of prisons in the 
United States in Brown v. Plata. Despite the apparent boldness of the 
Court’s remedy, the shortcomings of a merely reactive approach to 
constitutional punishment were made clear once more when the Court 
narrowed the horizon of judicial remediation to two unattractive choices: 
blunt and poorly related remedies, or no remediation at all.
20
  
 
 
whether and to what extent a managerial rationality has impacted the operation and institutional 
identity of courts. For an almost real-time analysis of the emergence of managerial rationality in 
complex criminal courts, see Máximo Langer & Joseph W. Doherty, Managerial Judging Goes 
International but Its Promise Remains Unfulfilled: An Empirical Assessment of the ITCY Reforms, 
36 YALE J. INT’L L. 241 (2011). 
 18. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 17, at 14. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Brown v. Plata affirms a remedial order from a federal three-judge panel for California to 
bring its prison population down to 137.5% of system capacity. 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011). The 
panel was convened under the authority of the Prison Litigation Reform Act and unified two class 
actions proposed by mentally disabled and physically ill or challenged prisoners, respectively. The first 
class action, Coleman v. Brown, was originally filed in 1990. Brown v. Plata was originally filed in 
2001. 
  
 
 
 
 
186 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 6:175 
 
 
 
 
Reflecting the weaknesses of the traditional reactive approach to 
punishment that they instantiate, these judicial policies continue to fall 
through the cracks of both the political theory of constitutional punishment 
and the constitutional morality of both the means and ends of punishment. 
In taking an integrative, reconstructive approach to the question of 
constitutional punishment, this Article shows a way out of this 
predicament.  
I. TRADITIONAL UNCONSTITUTIONAL PUNISHMENT:  
THE AMERICAN EXAMPLE  
Like most liberal democracies, the prison system in the United States 
is, as the Supreme Court recognizes, cruelty-ridden. One of the most 
disturbing features of this predicament is that the unconstitutional 
punishment doctrine developed by the Supreme Court directly and 
indirectly enshrines some of that cruelty. This doctrine is the cumulative 
result of legal analyses and choices concerned with the stipulation and 
management of standards of violation. That this has happened in the 
United States is puzzling, for here, more than in any other country, the 
courts have intervened extensively in an effort to rectify structural and 
system-wide cruel conditions of punishment. In this section, I reconstruct 
the jurisgenesis of American unconstitutional punishment doctrine, with 
heuristic focus on conditions-of-confinement Eighth Amendment cases. 
In Hutto v. Finney (1978),
21
 the Supreme Court stipulated that 
confinement is a form of punishment that attracts Eighth Amendment 
scrutiny. Confronting the question of whether double-celling constitutes 
cruel and unusual punishment, in Rhodes v. Chapman (1981), the Court 
started to cut back from Hutto by deciding that deprivations associated 
with overcrowding of prisons do not amount to punishment.
22
 The Rhodes 
Court held, however, that “[c]onditions in prison must not involve the 
wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, nor may they be grossly 
disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting imprisonment,” 
adding that conditions ought to be considered “alone or in combination” in 
order to determine whether they “deprive inmates of the minimal civilized 
measure of life’s necessities.”23 In the constitutional lineage of Hutto and 
 
 
 21. 437 U.S. 678 (1978). 
 22. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981). 
 23. “[C]onditions that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under contemporary standards are 
not unconstitutional. To the extent that such conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of 
the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society” Id. at 347. 
  
 
 
 
 
2014] RECONSTRUCTING CONSTITUTIONAL PUNISHMENT 187 
 
 
 
 
Rhodes, the Supreme Court reaffirmed in Helling v. McKinney (1993), that 
“the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which 
he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.”24  
Before Helling, the Supreme Court confronted a crucial doctrinal 
choice in Wilson v. Seiter (1991).
25
 Time and again, petitioners would 
come to the Court claiming incidents that occurred during confinement 
amounted to cruel punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 
However, for the most part, those incidents were considered just that, 
incidental—and not, strictly speaking, punishment for which an explicit 
decree could be found in either the relevant statute or sentence. In Wilson, 
the Court confronted a momentous doctrinal choice about whether to 
define punishment for Eighth Amendment purposes via a path leading 
through consideration of structural conditions of punishment or through 
consideration of the actual intention of state actors involved in the 
stipulation, application or management of punishment.  
Had the Wilson Court taken the structural path, it would have been 
forced to recognize that confinement necessarily subjects prisoners to 
specific as well as system-wide conditions, rendering prisoners vulnerable 
to unconstitutional harm. Thus, incidents occurring during confinement 
would be seen as part of the punishment, even when not specifically 
mentioned in statutes or sentences, and therefore brought within the 
purview of the Eighth Amendment. Taking the path of intention would 
mean instead that absent explicit provisions in law or sentences, the Court 
would only recognize as punishment incidents intentionally inflicted by 
prison officials. The Supreme Court in Wilson chose the latter definitional 
track,
26
 holding that absent explicit legal or judicial provision, events in 
the context of confinement are subject to the purview of the Eighth 
Amendment only if inflicted by officials acting with at least deliberate 
indifference. With this decision, the application in Estelle v. Gamble 
(1976) of a deliberate indifference standard to the narrower issue of lack of 
 
 
 24. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). The Eighth Amendment was implicitly 
incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause in State of Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. 
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947), but it was not until Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), that 
the incorporation was overtly affirmed.  
 25. 501 U.S. 294 (1991).  
 26. Under the state action doctrine, heightened scrutiny is alert to findings of constitutional 
violations on the sole basis of impact, thus dispensing with interrogation of the mens rea of public 
officials and their surrogates. As I show below, the current Eighth Amendment doctrine finds liable 
state action only when culpable conduct of state agents is present.  
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adequate medical care in prisons was extended to encompass all other 
cases of conditions of confinement.
27
 
Against this jurisprudential background, the Supreme Court came to 
Farmer v. Brennan (1994).
28
 I turn now to how the Court’s opinion in 
Farmer articulated the conceptions of punishment, cruelty, the right 
against cruel punishment, and remedies that characterize the Court’s 
reactive, unconstitutional punishment doctrine. At stake in the Farmer 
opinion is how the decision “equilibrated” the justiciability of cruelty 
claims, the substance of the right against cruelty, and the remedies 
apportioned to it.
29
 It is worth noting that the equilibration achieved in 
Farmer is fully reflected several years later in Brown v. Plata (2011). 
A. Punishment 
Dee Farmer, a male-to-female transgender inmate acting on her own 
behalf, filed a Bivens suit against several federal prison officials in their 
official only or official and personal capacities, depending upon the 
person. In her suit, Farmer alleged:  
[R]espondents either transferred petitioner to USP-Terre Haute or 
placed petitioner in its general population despite knowledge that 
the penitentiary had a violent environment and a history of inmate 
assaults, and despite knowledge that petitioner, as a transsexual who 
“projects feminine characteristics,” would be particularly vulnerable 
to sexual attack by some USP-Terre Haute inmates.
30
  
Indeed, less than two weeks after the transfer, Dee Farmer was beaten and 
raped by another inmate in her own cell.
31
 This, Dee Farmer claimed, 
“amounted to a deliberately indifferent failure to protect [her] safety, and 
thus to a violation of [her] Eighth Amendment rights.”32 For the harm 
suffered, Farmer “sought compensatory and punitive damages, and an 
 
 
 27. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
 28. 511 U.S. 825 (1994). Farmer v. Brennan, a case against federal prison officials, allows for 
doctrinal analysis to proceed without being sidetracked by problems arising in the area of sovereign 
immunity. 
 29. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—And their 
Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633 (2006).  
 30. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 830-31. 
 31.  Id. at 830. 
 32.  Id. at 831. 
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injunction barring future confinement in any penitentiary, including USP-
Terre Haute.”33 
In Farmer, the Supreme Court faced what would be another 
momentous doctrinal choice. Should it keep, relax, or harden the Wilson 
deliberate indifference standard? The Court chose to affirm it,
34
 but with a 
significant twist.
35
 On its face, the deliberate indifference standard evokes 
criminal negligence. Under the Model Penal Code, criminal negligence 
occurs when an agent neglects a substantial and unjustifiable risk 
associated with his conduct, and of which he failed to become aware when 
he should have.
36
 If, oblivious to a risk he should know, the agent proceeds 
in his conduct and causes criminal harm, he acts in a criminally negligent 
way. Deliberate indifference would seem to attract a similar should-have-
known standard.  
Instead, the Farmer majority analogized the Wilson deliberate 
indifference standard to criminal recklessness. In the Model Penal Code 
definition, recklessness is conduct that consciously disregards a substantial 
and unjustifiable risk of harm.
37
 Creating a recklessness-like requirement 
for each discrete aspect of punishment, the Court opined that “[b]ecause 
. . . prison officials who lacked knowledge of a risk cannot be said to have 
inflicted punishment, it remains open to the officials to prove that they 
were unaware even of an obvious risk to inmate health or safety.” This 
upgrading of deliberate indifference from negligence to recklessness 
acquired dramatic dimensions when compounded with the requirements of 
 
 
 33. Id. Congress has since passed the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003. 42 U.S.C. § 15606 
(2003). PREA created the National Prison Rape Elimination Commission, charged with 
recommending to the Attorney General “national standards for enhancing the detection, prevention, 
reduction, and punishment of prison rape.” 42 U.S.C. § 15606(e)(1) (2003). Finally in 2012, the 
Department of Justice issued the National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape. 
See 28 C.F.R. § 115 (2012). The standards include a requirement “that inmates be screened for risk of 
being sexually abused or sexually abusive and that screening information be used to inform housing, 
bed, work, education, and program assignments. The goal is to keep inmates at high risk of 
victimization away from those at high risk of committing abuse.” DEPT. OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL 
STANDARDS TO PREVENT, DETECT, AND RESPOND TO PRISON RAPE 6 (2012), available at 
http://ojp.gov/programs/pdfs/prea_final_rule.pdf. 
 34. The Farmer v. Brennan Court vacated the Court of Appeals judgment in favor of Farmer, 
remanding the case to the District Court for further evidentiary search and judgment. Farmer, 511 U.S. 
at 851. 
 35. On the culpability standard in Farmer v. Brennan, see Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison 
Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881 (2009), criticizing the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Farmer v. Brennan to raise the standard of culpability of prison officials for cruelty 
in violation of the Eighth Amendment from the equivalent to criminal negligence (“gross negligence,” 
in the Court’s parlance) to criminal recklessness. 
 36. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962). 
 37. Id. 
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effective defense stipulated by the Court. “[P]rison officials who actually 
knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free 
from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm 
ultimately was not averted. A prison official’s duty under the Eighth 
Amendment is to ensure reasonable safety . . . .”38  
In Farmer, the Supreme Court did recognize the vulnerability-creating 
aspect of confinement, writing that “having stripped [prisoners] of 
virtually every means of self-protection and foreclosed their access to 
outside aid, the government and its officials are not free to let the state of 
nature take its course.”39 Why then resist the derivation of the logical legal 
consequence from this recognition, namely that punishment is a structure-
connected predicament? Whatever the reasons, the fact is that the Farmer 
opinion, now quoting from Rhodes,
40
 fell back to the intentional paradigm 
in the definition of punishment, proclaiming that “[b]eing violently 
assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders 
pay for their offenses against society.”41  
The doctrinal reduction in the ontology of punishment in Farmer was, 
in conclusion, twofold. First, the reduction assessed the specific 
circumstances of an individual’s punishment through the lens of the 
abstract, the general penalty that the law prescribed and the actual sentence 
handed down. Second, the reduction required intention on the part of 
officials for any harm in the punitive context to be technically considered 
punishment under the purview of the Eighth Amendment. In terms of the 
ontology of punishment, the current cruel punishment doctrine applicable 
to the context of confinement combines objective textualist (stipulation in 
statute or sentence) and subjective motivationalist (the intentionalism of 
reckless deliberate indifference on the part of state actors) elements in the 
definition of punishment. This combination, I argue below, is seriously 
underinclusive. 
 
 
 38. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). The forgotten lesson here is that of the dissent in Resweber: “The intent of the executioner 
cannot lessen the torture or excuse the result.” State of Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 
459, 477 (1947) . 
 39. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833 (emphasis added). 
 40. 452 U.S. 337 (1981). 
 41. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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B. Cruelty 
Consistent with its reactive focus on violations, the Supreme Court’s 
definition of cruelty under the Constitution mirrors its definition of 
punishment. Objectively, a sufficiently severe harm amounts to cruelty if 
the punitive agency that caused it did so pursuant to a statute or sentence 
found to have violated the relevant general constitutional limitation on 
punishment. Subjectively, when not a stipulation of law or sentence, any 
harm must be recklessly caused or so allowed to take place by prison 
officials. Because of its reliance on an objectively ascertainable 
prohibitory norm and on intentional agency, the resulting understanding of 
cruelty combines objective and subjective elements, to which I return 
below in Part II. For now, I just point to the main aspects of objective and 
subjective conceptions of cruelty.  
Reflecting an objective conception of cruelty, in Farmer the Supreme 
Court followed a traditional two-sided heuristic of cruelty. In the first leg 
of the heuristic, following Justice Stevens’ concurring-dissenting opinion 
in Hudson v. Palmer,
42
 Farmer reaffirmed that “gratuitously allowing the 
beating or rape of one prisoner by another serves no legitimate penological 
objective . . . .”43 In the second, citing Estelle v. Gamble44 for authority and 
quoting Trop v. Dulles,
45
 Farmer concluded that gratuitous beating or rape 
does not conform to “evolving standards of decency.”46 Bringing together 
the two sides of the heuristic—legitimate penological objectives and 
evolving moral standards—a harm reaches the cruelty threshold in the 
infliction of punishment only when brutality and suffering are 
penologically inexpedient and shocking to society’s standard of decency.47 
To this understanding of cruelty, Farmer adds the rejection of the view 
that the cumulative effect of different aspects of the confinement condition 
can result in cruelty. It is not as if, the Court said, “all prison conditions 
are a seamless web for Eighth Amendment purposes.”48 Thus, if brutality 
and deprivation by official conduct are found not to serve legitimate 
 
 
 42. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 541 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 43. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 44. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
 45. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
 46. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833 (citation omitted). 
 47. To appeal to popular standards of decency is to outsource constitutional interpretation to the 
social creation of value-facts. Space is not available to explore here this practice of outsourcing.  
 48. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 305 (1991). 
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penological objectives or to be abhorrent in public opinion, they would 
violate constitutional limitations on punishment and the resulting harm 
would meet objective definitional requirements of cruelty. 
Reflecting a subjective conception of cruelty, the Farmer opinion 
stipulated that if penologically unnecessary brutality against inmates and 
the resulting suffering were recklessly inflicted or allowed to occur by 
prison officials (or prescribed by legislators or sentencing judges), the 
resulting harm would meet the subjective definitional element of cruelty. 
Farmer concluded that prison officials are liable under the Eighth 
Amendment for their deliberate indifference toward the “health and 
safety” of inmates only if prison officials can be shown not only to have 
known that inmates faced a “substantial risk of serious harm,” but also 
“disregard[ed] that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate 
it.”49  
In Farmer, the petitioner specifically argued that without an objective 
standard for “deliberate indifference,” prison officials would have an 
incentive not only to disregard “obvious dangers,” but to defensively avoid 
exposure to any knowledge about such dangers, with a potentially 
devastating systematic impact.
50
 The Court responded to petitioner’s claim 
with an argument that was rather off the mark. It wrote: 
Under the test we adopt today, an Eighth Amendment claimant need 
not show that a prison official acted or failed to act believing that 
harm actually would befall an inmate; it is enough that the official 
acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of 
serious harm.
51
  
The Court’s response misfired because in trying to justify the adoption of 
a criminal recklessness-like standard of culpability for Eighth Amendment 
violations, it redundantly stipulated that the requirements of the 
recklessness standard were not those of the knowledge standard. The 
Model Penal Code defines “knowing” criminal conduct as the agent’s 
awareness “that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a 
result.”52 Thus, when the Court said that a petitioner “need not show that a 
prison official acted or failed to act believing that harm actually would 
 
 
 49. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 848. It is like having to sue, under applicable lemon law, the Ford Motor 
Company’s factory employee that actually assembled the malfunctioning brake of your car. 
 50. See Dolovich, supra note 35. 
 51. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. 
 52. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962). 
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befall an inmate,” it was actually just saying that the standard is not 
“knowledge,” not justifying why it should be that of “recklessness.” 
Adumbrating the subjectivism of criminal recklessness in the concept 
of cruelty, the Court further argued: 
The Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual 
“conditions”; it outlaws cruel and unusual punishments.” . . . [A]n 
official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have 
perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot be 
condemned as the infliction of punishment.
53
  
“This Court’s cases,” Farmer added, “mandate inquiry into a prison 
official’s state of mind, . . . and it is no accident that the Court has 
repeatedly said that the Eighth Amendment has a ‘subjective 
component.’”54 Hence, without the mens rea of the agent, cruelty 
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment cannot be found. This subjectivism 
in the definition of cruelty thus coheres remarkably with the subjectivism 
in the definition of punishment discussed above.  
The Supreme Court’s peculiar combination of objectivism and 
subjectivism in the jurisprudence of cruelty is more than a doctrinal 
misstep—it shows deficiency in realism. It does not even come close to 
capturing the reality of cruelty in prisons and jails. There are many ways 
in which a particular legal doctrine can fail. It can be unfair, unrealistic, or 
inexpert. The definition of cruelty emerging from the Farmer judgment is 
all these things.  
C. Right 
When the Supreme Court selected intentionalism over structuralism in 
the definition of punishment, and when it restricted cruelty to the specific 
combination of objective and subjective elements analyzed above, it set 
itself up, for all practical and theoretical purposes, for a misunderstanding 
of the substance of the right against cruel punishment. How deeply this 
narrow focus on conditions of unconstitutionality affects the Eighth 
Amendment right jurisprudence is also clear in Farmer.  
Current reactive constitutional punishment doctrine attaches both 
negative and positive obligations to the Eighth Amendment right. In 
Farmer, the Court posited that “[t]he Eighth Amendment places restraints 
on prison officials, who may not, for example, use excessive physical 
 
 
 53. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-38. 
 54. Id. at 826 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299 (1991)). 
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force against prisoners.”55 Farmer also asserted the Amendment “imposes 
duties on these officials, who must provide humane conditions of 
confinement,” including basic necessities such as food, clothing, and 
shelter, as well as medical care and safety.
56
 Setting aside for a moment 
the doctrinal problems with intentionalism in this area, one might think 
that under the Eighth Amendment the Court bans conditions of 
confinement that do not meet the basic necessities of life and safety. 
However, the Court’s definition of punishment prevents it from going in 
that direction when defining the substance of the right not to be cruelly 
punished. So much so that, as noted above, the Court proclaimed that “the 
Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual ‘conditions’; it 
outlaws cruel and unusual ‘punishments.’”57 
Transposing this understanding of the Eighth Amendment right onto 
cases in which, as in Farmer, the proximate agent of cruelty was another 
inmate, the Court has decided that not all injuries inflicted by prisoners on 
each other attract the Eighth Amendment-based tort-like liability for 
prison officials or the government under whose authority the prison 
operates. For a prison official to be liable, two requirements must be 
present: “First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently 
serious
58
 . . . . The second requirement follows from the principle that 
‘only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth 
Amendment.’”59 These two requirements map almost perfectly onto the 
distinctions made in the two previous sections between objective and 
subjective aspects of the Court’s conceptions of punishment and cruelty.60  
The substance of the Eighth Amendment right that emerges from 
Farmer, in specular relation to Farmer’s conceptions of punishment and 
cruelty, is disturbing. The government’s direct Eighth Amendment 
obligations are limited to the kind, intensity, and proportionality of 
 
 
 55. Id. at 832 (citing Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1 (1992)) (emphasis added). 
 56. Id. (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984)) (emphasis added). The Court in 
Brown v. Plata would again return to the problem of prisoners’ health, only this time within a 
causational chain linked back to overcrowding.  
 57. Id. at 837. 
 58. “[A] prison official’s act or omission,” says the Court, “must result in the denial of the 
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities. For a claim . . . based on failure to prevent harm, the 
inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” 
Id. at 834 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 59. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 60. As I have argued, the Court defines punishment objectively as that which is stipulated in a 
statute or sentence, or subjectively as deprivations caused by the reckless deliberate indifference of 
prison officials. In relation to cruelty, cruelty is objectively found when serious harm suffered by 
inmates is penologically inexpedient and shocking to the general standard of decency. Subjectively, 
cruelty obtains when officials act recklessly, causing serious harm or allowing it to be caused. 
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punishment stipulated in its criminal statutes or in the sentences of its 
judges.
61
 In an inversion of state action doctrine, responsibility for any 
cruelty inflicted on prisoners not based on the text of statute or sentence 
falls upon prison officials only if they act with reckless deliberate 
indifference. The universe of cruel punishment left outside this binomial 
of text and intention is large and potentially expansionist.  
There is yet another aspect of the Court’s understanding of the 
substance of the Eighth Amendment—one that bears directly on the 
questions of the constitutional and political theory of the general part of 
the criminal law. Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution invests Congress 
with all “necessary and proper” legislative power for the discharge of its 
constitutional mandate. Among the many laws that Congress enacts under 
this constitutional authority are, naturally, a myriad of criminal statutes. 
The legitimacy of society’s interest in social order, personal security, and 
other interests and values promoted by criminal statutes is not in dispute. 
In the criminal justice system, the legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches are expected to operate jointly to keep society orderly and 
criminal conduct in check. The coercive nature of the operation of any 
effective system of criminal justice is undeniable and unavoidable. But all 
this takes place within the confines of a constitutional order premised on 
life, liberty, property, dignity, and the rejection of cruel punishment. In 
legitimate constitutional orders, the fundamental core or the minimum 
content of individual rights are only surrendered in extraordinary 
circumstances. In legitimate constitutional punishment, they are at most 
compromised. In short, they are to be made proportional to, or compatible 
with, other competing high constitutional values.  
There is, therefore, a prima facie clash of constitutional principles in 
the constitutional ordering of criminal justice. What does this clash mean 
for how we understand the substance of the Eighth Amendment right?  
If one takes the understanding of the Eight Amendment right as it has 
implicitly and explicitly emerged in Farmer as an answer to this question, 
one is bound to be disappointed. To do so would be to misunderstand the 
nature of fundamental rights in general, and the right against cruel 
punishment in particular, to force a compromise with penological 
objectives (especially those legitimized on extra-constitutional grounds), 
to make the right dependent on majoritarian consensus about civilizational 
 
 
 61. Taking into account variations from federal to state jurisdiction, and among the various state 
jurisdictions, decisions of parole boards may conceivably meet the textualist requirement. For due 
process-based criticism of punishment enhancement at the sentencing stage, see Frank R. Herrmann, 
30=20: “Understanding” Maximum Sentence Enhancements, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 175 (1998). 
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standards, or to shield the punitive state behind the culpability of its 
agents. Fundamental rights are fundamental and rights for a reason. They 
are supposed to resist expediency, oppose opinion, and obligate the state, 
its actors, and its proxies.  
Centering analysis of constitutional punishment on moral, ideological, 
or managerial disputes about what renders punishment unconstitutional 
has certainly created an unconstitutional punishment doctrine. This 
doctrine, as it currently stands, has its own legal, moral, and political 
problems. The negative sociological consequences of this doctrine are well 
known. But as we step back and look at the long arc of constitutional 
evolution, an even greater problem appears. Indeed, the orchestration over 
time of an entire line of jurisprudence concerned with violation of a 
fundamental right has distracted intellectual, moral, and political vigor 
from the essential task of understanding the nature and foundations of 
constitutional punishment in legitimate constitutional orders.  
The failure to nurture a dialogue on the substance of constitutional 
punishment has detrimentally affected the reactive doctrine. This negative 
impact is especially apparent in the justiciability of rights violation claims 
and the remedies attached to findings of constitutional breach. The Farmer 
opinion once again illustrates the point, well summarized in the decision 
syllabus which tells us that the criminal recklessness standard “will not 
foreclose prospective injunctive relief, nor require a prisoner to suffer 
physical injury before obtaining prospective relief.”62 Let us probe this 
claim in the context of the “equilibration” of the substance, justiciability, 
and remedies of a right that arise out of the line of cases that I have been 
analyzing up to Brown v. Plata.
63
  
To start, it is helpful to concede that the applicability of the Eighth 
Amendment is limited to the context of punishment. How then are we to 
determine what counts as punishment? In answering this fundamental 
question, the Supreme Court recognizes only two kinds of punishment: 
 
 
 62. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 826–27. 
 63. In its simplest formulation, “equilibration” refers to the way courts adjust the three points 
(substance of the right, justiciability, and remedies) of the doctrinal equation of any fundamental right 
in order not to be forced into adopting remedies that they, for a variety of reasons, do not favor. See 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 
104 HARV. L. REV. 1731 (1991). “Equilibration” seems also to be a phenomenon of equitable 
jurisdiction broadly defined. Zygmunt J.B. Plater sheds light on the “balancing of equities” practice in 
equitable jurisdiction by identifying three analytically different balancing or equilibrating stages, 
namely “threshold balancing” (analogous to justiciability in rights equilibration theory), 
“determination of contending conducts” (analogous to determination of the substance of rights being 
equilibrated), and “discretion in fashioning remedies” (the remedial stage in rights equilibration). See 
Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 524 (1982).  
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first, that which is formally designated as such in criminal statutes and 
sentences, and, second, the deprivation or violence that is inflicted upon 
prisoners by prison officials whose conduct displays reckless (deliberate) 
indifference. Absent either objectively (textually) stipulated or otherwise 
culpably inflicted harm, no Eighth Amendment claim of cruelty in the 
context of imprisonment is justiciable because no punishment would have 
taken place.
64
  
This narrow definition of what counts as punishment shapes the 
substance of the right against cruel punishment. While facially cruel 
punishment as per statute or sentence is now relatively less frequent, cases 
such as Brown v. Plata, which address claims of cruel conditions of 
confinement, continue to reach the courts. In adjudicating the small 
portion of these claims coming before it, the Supreme Court has decided 
that only cruelty that can be causally connected to omissive or comissive 
reckless (deliberate) indifference on the part of officials is punishment 
forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. Thus, for all practical purposes, the 
substance of the Eighth Amendment right may be formulated as a right 
against prison officials’ intentional brutality or reckless indifference that 
causes severe suffering. It is easy to see how the narrow definition of 
punishment corresponds to a narrow understanding of the substance of the 
Eighth Amendment right.  
The narrow conception of the right in turn leads to a restrictive 
approach to justiciability. Under the reactive constitutional punishment 
doctrine, only claims of cruel conditions of confinement that point to 
deliberately indifferent conduct by officials are actionable. The narrow 
definition of the right and the corresponding restrictive approach to 
justiciability lead, next, to a frugal approach to remedies. Except for 
injunctions, which are very difficult to obtain under the current doctrinal 
framework, remedies for the violation of the Eighth Amendment tend to 
amount to damages recovered against prison officials. Brown v. Plata 
would appear to carry some promise in this regard, to which I will return 
in a moment. 
These developments leading up to Farmer and Brown defined the way 
the Eighth Amendment right, the justiciability of violation claims, and 
remedies were equilibrated after the culpability standard was 
approximated to criminal recklessness. In order to qualify for injunctive 
relief to prevent harm in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the plaintiff 
in Farmer had to prove that in their “current attitudes and conduct,” prison 
 
 
 64. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991).  
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officials showed reckless and deliberate indifference.
65
 The Court 
clarified: 
An inmate seeking an injunction on the ground that there is a 
contemporary violation of a nature likely to continue, must 
adequately plead such a violation; to survive summary judgment, he 
must come forward with evidence from which it can be inferred that 
the defendant-officials were at the time the suit was filed, and are at 
the time of summary judgment, knowingly and unreasonably 
disregarding an objectively intolerable risk of harm, and that they 
will continue to do so; and finally to establish eligibility for an 
injunction, the inmate must demonstrate the continuance of that 
disregard during the remainder of the litigation and into the future. 
In so doing, the inmate may rely . . . on developments that postdate 
the pleadings and pretrial motions, as the defendants may rely on 
such developments to establish that the inmate is not entitled to an 
injunction. If the [trial] court finds the Eighth Amendment’s 
subjective and objective requirements satisfied, it may grant 
appropriate injunctive relief.
66
  
In relation to the recklessness standard, the petitioner in Farmer quite 
reasonably argued the recklessness test would entail that prisoners would 
first have to be victims of cruelty “before obtaining court-ordered 
correction of objectively inhumane prison conditions.”67 In response, the 
Court posited that “[i]t would, indeed, be odd to deny an injunction to 
inmates who plainly proved an unsafe, life-threatening condition in their 
prison on the ground that nothing yet had happened to them. But nothing 
in the test we adopt today clashes with that common sense.”68 The Court 
then added: 
Petitioner’s argument is flawed for the simple reason that one does 
not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain 
preventive relief. Consistently with this principle, a subjective 
approach to deliberate indifference does not require a prisoner 
 
 
 65. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 845 (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993)). 
 66. Id. at 845–46 (relying on Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685–88 (1978), for authority with 
regard to injunction as a remedy for prison conditions that are objectively offensive to the Eighth 
Amendment) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 67. Id. at 845. 
 68. Id. (citing Helling, 509 U.S. at 33; Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593 (1923)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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seeking a remedy for unsafe conditions to await a tragic event such 
as an actual assault before obtaining relief.
69
  
However, there is very little in the Court’s opinion to give hope that 
petitioners would be able to overcome the high bars that the Court’s 
equilibration of justiciability and remedies raised on the basis of 
narrowing the substance of the right. 
This situation was not created by the Court alone. Only a year after 
Farmer, and four years after Wilson, Congress passed the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA). The PLRA requires exhaustion of all 
available administrative remedies before a suit with respect to prison 
conditions can be brought in federal court.
70
 In Woodford v. Ngo,
71
 the 
Supreme Court interpreted this requirement to include the retrospective 
obligation of having followed administrative procedures that were once 
available even when they are no longer so. The PLRA framework also 
authorizes the courts to summarily dismiss any claim for which there is no 
effective or timely remediation. Another aspect of the statute is that it 
closes the courts’ doors to claims of “mental and emotional injury suffered 
while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.”72 Finally, the 
statute gives defendants the prerogative to waive the right to reply to any 
Section 1983 prisoner suit without the usual “admission of allegations” 
consequence. Under this provision, courts may require defendants to reply 
only if a court concludes plaintiffs have a prima facie “reasonable 
opportunity to prevail on the merits.” The PLRA also decrees “no relief 
 
 
 69. Id. (citing Pennsylvania, 262 U.S. at 593; Helling, 509 U.S. at 33–34) (internal marks 
omitted). 
 70. Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2013). 
 71. 548 U.S. 81 (2006). 
 72. Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2013). Contrast this to the definition of 
torture in 18 U.S.C. § 2340. There we read that: 
(1) “[T]orture” means an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically 
intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering 
incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control;  
(2) “severe mental pain or suffering” means the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting 
from—  
(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering;  
(B) the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind-
altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the 
personality;  
(C) the threat of imminent death; or  
(D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical 
pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind-altering substances or other 
procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality . . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 2340 (1994). 
  
 
 
 
 
200 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 6:175 
 
 
 
 
shall be granted to the plaintiff unless a reply has been filed.” In effect, the 
combination of these two principles not only narrows justiciability to a 
keyhole; it allows defendants to decide in some cases whether or not the 
plaintiff will have the opportunity to pursue relief. 
If I am right about the doctrinal reorientation developed in the second 
part of this article, the PLRA stands on shaky constitutional grounds, and 
the justiciability of cruel punishment claims under Wilson and Farmer is 
by no means on firmer constitutional basis. However, as they now stand, 
the combination of constitutional jurisprudence and statutory framework 
poses burdens and restrictions that violate the letter, the structure, and the 
spirit of the Constitution. For all its good intentions, Brown v. Plata serves 
to illustrate this point. 
The lower Coleman v. Brown and Plata v. Brown courts found that 
medical and mental health care provided to the plaintiff classes in 
California prisons violated their Eighth Amendment right against cruel 
punishment. After many years of remedial attempts overseen by Masters 
and Receivers, the two cases were unified and brought under a three-judge 
panel. The panel found that after a period of insufficient progress, regress 
set in. Overpopulation, the panel established, was the principal cause of 
conditions bearing on the provision of mental health and medical care to 
prisoners. Accordingly, the panel concluded that without reduction of the 
prison population, no remedial solution would likely succeed in the future. 
Following those findings, the panel ordered a reduction of the California 
prison population to 137.5% of capacity within 2 years, except if equitable 
adjustments were recommended due to changed conditions or the state 
presented viable alternatives. This was the order upheld by the Supreme 
Court in Brown v. Plata. 
At first glance, the injunctive remedy affirmed by the Supreme Court in 
Brown turns its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in a new bold direction. 
However, a close examination of the decision places it squarely within the 
inherited confines of reactive, unconstitutional punishment doctrine.  
To start, the remedy is too blunt. While it helpfully focuses on a 
structural, system-wide factor that leads to cruel treatment of many 
individual prisoners, the remedy fails to directly address any specific 
violation. A second problem is that there is no guarantee that those who 
have suffered a violation of their Eighth Amendment right would directly 
benefit from early release if it were to be granted.
73
 If members of the 
 
 
 73. The Brown v. Plata Court acknowledges this fact. Unfortunately, that Court does not come 
close to being persuasive about why this is not a problem to constitutionally vitiate the way the remedy 
will apparently be implemented. 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1937–39 (2011). 
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plaintiff classes are not freed as redress for the violations they personally 
suffered, there is very little to indicate that their mental health and medical 
care will improve substantially. Although the general prison population 
will decrease, the number of prisoners in need of care and the quality and 
number of staff available to provide the care will not, ceteris paribus, 
necessarily have changed. Finally, even if those eventually released 
include members of the plaintiff classes, there is no further post-release 
redress awarded. But a simple question may suffice to unveil the 
limitations of the pedigree from which Brown descends: taking the 
reasoning and remedy assignment of Brown seriously, why would it be 
constitutional for California to incarcerate, in the next two years, 
individuals with even moderate mental health and medical needs?
74
  
The blame for this predicament should not rest solely with legislators 
and constitutional courts, though. Again in the example of the United 
States, the very history of the constitutional text shows how much the 
criminal justice system is entwined with cruelty and degradation of human 
dignity. Adopted just seven decades after the Eighth Amendment, the 
Thirteenth Amendment of 1865 recognizes the right not to be enslaved or 
placed in involuntary servitude,
75
 “except,” it adds, “as a punishment for 
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted . . . .”76 During the 
years preceding the Civil War, slavery and involuntary servitude became 
increasingly unacceptable to the American public. Yet the Civil War 
generation, who saw two percent of their friends, family, and neighbors 
die in a devastating war to abolish slavery,
77
 found it acceptable to reserve 
involuntary servitude as a form of punishment. This reservation illustrates 
well the depth of the stigma against the convict.
78
  
 
 
 74. One could also criticize the Court for enabling procrastination on the part of the state. The 
end of the Court’s decision truly provides a “with all deliberate speed” recipe. See id. at 1945–46. 
 75. This right to freedom from enslavement and involuntary servitude, incidentally, is the only 
right in the federal constitutional framework that indisputably dispenses with the requirement of state 
action. While courts have held prison officials liable for damages under the Eighth Amendment, this 
liability, of course, still depends upon state action, which in these cases is found in “imprisoning.” 
That prison officials are made to pay, in their private capacity, tortious damage under the Eighth 
Amendment is an example of the confusion that presides over Eighth Amendment doctrine.  
 76. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
 77. See DREW GILPIN FAUST, THIS REPUBLIC OF SUFFERING: DEATH AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL 
WAR (2008).  
 78. This is not to say racial and penal stigmatizations do not intersect. We have seen time and 
again that they indeed do. This issue often comes back to the Court, as, for example, in McCleskey v. 
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), and the discussion therein of the racial breakdown of death penalty 
statistics (in this case the Baldus study, showing by regressive analysis the disparity in capital 
sentencing of blacks in general and in particular of those accused of homicide against whites). The 
Court was nevertheless not convinced.  
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However, despite the ambivalence just noted, constitutional history and 
structure warrant a paradigm change. Indeed, structural interpretation of 
the Constitution suggests that the framers understood well the heightened 
vulnerability of the investigated individual and the convict.
79
 The Eighth 
Amendment protection against cruelty is a specific individual right and an 
obligation cast by the Constitution and its agents on the state.
80
 The 
Framers certainly witnessed how easily otherwise legitimate punishment 
can veer into cruelty. We know that nature and society exhibit a cyclorama 
of cruel events every day, and while the law is sometimes indifferent to 
this spectacle of brutality and suffering, it is not always so. When it is not, 
as in the case of the clause against cruel punishment, we expect it to work 
fairly and efficiently.  
And yet, looking back to the jurisprudential landscape presented here, 
it is difficult to imagine that the Supreme Court will be able to repair the 
many shortcomings in its unconstitutional punishment doctrine without a 
change in the constitutional paradigm. Internal doctrinal as well as 
political reasons stand in the way. It is to a new paradigm that I now turn. 
In the new paradigm, violation is moved to the constitutional back seat and 
the focus turns to the foundations of punishment as a legitimate, routine 
constitutional practice.  
II. RECONSTRUCTING CONSTITUTIONAL PUNISHMENT: FIVE PRINCIPLES  
Reactive unconstitutional punishment doctrine, I have pointed out, 
betrays a profound embarrassment with punishment. It only reluctantly 
takes ownership of punishment as an exercise in toleration. Ironically, this 
turning of the constitutional gaze away from punishment has only made 
the practice of punishment more brutal and more constitutionally 
 
 
 79. “What has distinguished our ancestors?—That they would not admit of tortures, or cruel and 
barbarous punishment,” said Patrick Henry in the Virginia ratifying convention debate on June 16, 
1788. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 447 (Jonathon Elliot ed., Burt Franklin 1888).  
 80. In the Eighth Amendment doctrine, “unusual” means either punishment that is 
disproportional to the respective offense or shocking to the community’s evolving standard of 
decency. See Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted”: The Original 
Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969). See also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); R. v. 
Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 (Can.), wherein the Supreme Court of Canada struck down mandatory 
sentencing under the Narcotics Control Act as cruelly disproportionate; Steele v. Mountain Institution, 
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 1385 (Can.), wherein the Supreme Court of Canada found a violation of the cruel 
punishment clause of the Charter where “[r]espondent’s imprisonment had long ago reached the point at 
which he had derived ‘the maximum benefit from imprisonment.’ His incarceration was longer than that 
served by the vast majority of the most cruel and callous murderers and was of doubtful benefit given the 
unavailability of psychiatric treatment.” 
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repulsive. Punishment is not going anywhere though. Punishment’s place 
is at the center of the constitutional stage. The other option is to continue 
to hide it in human warehouses. 
In this part of the Article, the five integrative principles are woven into 
the reconstruction of constitutional punishment doctrine.
81
 These 
principles combine reactive and proactive elements as well as moral and 
political arguments. They speak to the policing of the outer limits of 
punishment, as in the example of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in the 
United States. But more importantly, these principles also seek to 
reconstruct punishment in such a way that it will rest on foundational 
constitutional values such as order, equality, justice, freedom, and human 
dignity.  
A. Punishment, Vulnerability, and Human Dignity 
Much of current constitutional punishment doctrine around the world 
turns, as the analysis in Part I exemplified, on the definition of 
punishment. In this Section, I discuss the textual, experiential, intentional, 
and structural elements in the ontology of punishment. I also explore the 
proper place of legitimate penological objectives in the context of a 
comprehensive doctrinal framework for constitutional punishment. The 
thesis of this section is twofold: (1) a proper definition of punishment must 
emphasize structuralism, complementing it with intentionalism; and 
(2) the best way to understand punishment is to see it as the imposition of 
generalized coerced vulnerability.  
1. Redefining Punishment as Generalized Coerced Vulnerability 
Moral theories of criminal law condition the legitimacy of punishment 
on the purposes it is believed to serve. Among these purposes are 
atonement and expiation, compliance with retributive duties, expression of 
society’s moral disapproval, greater social wellbeing through general and 
 
 
 81. To recapitulate: First, constitutional orders must take constitutional ownership of punishment 
as coerced vulnerability created and imposed by them. Second, state violence in the form of 
punishment must be conceived and designed as cruelty-free, and practiced under this regulative ideal. 
Third, respect for individuals as the embodiment of human dignity must be actively affirmed 
through—rather than simply not violated by—punishment. Fourth, this affirmation of human dignity 
through punishment entails that punishment must meet morally justified penological objectives and 
take seriously the moral agency of those subject to it. Finally, punishment that fails the above 
conditions must be fully redressable and adequate preventative remedies must be available and 
accessible. 
  
 
 
 
 
204 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 6:175 
 
 
 
 
special deterrence or incapacitation, and rehabilitation.
82
 The purposes of 
punishment and what, if anything, could serve to legitimize it will be 
discussed below. Here, I focus exclusively on the distinct and equally 
important problem of the ontology of punishment, which is central to our 
political and constitutional understanding of punishment. 
The ontological inquiry seeks to identify the essential and distinctive 
elements of legal punishment, rather than under what set of conditions and 
purposes punishment can be deemed morally legitimate. Perhaps 
surprisingly, there is considerable consensus about the constitutive 
elements of punishment.
83
 Disagreement concerns what amounts to 
foreground and background in the definition.  
No one disputes that punishment is a form of state coercion or that it 
has textual, experiential, intentional, and structural elements.
84
 The 
challenge is in how to understand and weigh these elements in the search 
for an adequate definition. Textualism is a type of nominalism. It defines 
punishment as that which is specified as such in statutes, sentences, and 
administrative decisions or guidelines. Experientialism seeks to capture 
the specificity of punishment vis-à-vis other negative legal sanctions by 
asking how a given sanction is experienced by those subjected to it.
85
 If a 
sanction is experienced as punitive, then punishment it is.
86
 Intentionalism 
relies on the intentions of legislators, sentencing judges or correctional 
officials in order to determine what types of impacts on the lives of those 
subject to negative sanctions constitute punishment in the technical sense. 
Finally, structuralists focus on the isolated and cumulative impacts or main 
restrictions that sanctions impose in order to determine whether the 
definitional tipping point into punishment has been reached. 
Textualism takes a semantic path to a dead end. The example of 
confinement illustrates this point. To objectively understand punishment 
solely as the type, place, and duration of deprivations stated in statutes, 
 
 
 82. Deontological, consequentialist, and perfectionist foundations have been offered for these 
purposes of punishment. Although important in a general sense, resolution of the questions arising in 
those discussions is not essential for the argument developed in this Article.  
 83. See, e.g., A READER ON PUNISHMENT (R.A. Duff & David Garland eds., 2d ed. 1995). 
 84. I have created these categories in order to more precisely distinguish elements that are 
lumped together in the current literature on the ontology of punishment.  
 85. The literature on the Eighth Amendment has in part been attuned to the experience of 
punishment. See Thomas K. Landry, “Punishment” and the Eighth Amendment, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1607, 1610 (1996); Eva S. Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Humane 
Punishment to Constitutional Discourse, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 111 (2007). For an opposing view, 
see David Gray, Punishment as Suffering, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1617 (2010). 
 86. In this case, impeachment, deportation, disbarment, and civil confinement may all be 
considered legal sanctions of the punishment subtype.  
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sentences, or prison regulations is to seriously misunderstand the all-
encompassing and capillary impact of coerced confinement on the life of 
the incarcerated. This is, however, exactly the path Justice Thomas would 
have us take, when he writes in his concurrence in Farmer, “I adhere to 
my belief expressed in Hudson and [Helling] that judges or juries—but not 
jailers—impose ‘punishment.’ . . . Conditions of confinement are not,” he 
concludes, “punishment in any recognized sense of the term, unless 
imposed as part of a sentence.”87  
The textualist cure for this under-inclusiveness would be a virtually 
endless, and therefore also impractical, list of impositions that all 
sentences to confinement necessarily imply. It is of course of little help to 
say that what defines punishment is the type, place, and duration of 
confinement and all that follows from these, for the point of contention is 
precisely what part of the manifold consequences of confinement is 
punishment for moral and political-constitutional purposes. As we have 
seen, in its unconstitutional punishment doctrine, the United States 
Supreme Court has rejected a purely textualist approach, recognizing that 
the Eighth Amendment “could be applied to some deprivations that were 
not specifically part of the sentence but were suffered during 
imprisonment,” as far as reckless deliberate indifference is implicated.88 
Experientialism, when understood as an inquiry into how each 
individual receives the impact of sanctions, offers an unmanageable 
framework. Its inspiration is, nonetheless, noble. In his concurrence in 
Farmer, Justice Blackmun made an eloquent case for experientialism, 
writing that the “Court’s unduly narrow definition of punishment blinds it 
to the reality of prison life.” He then invited consideration of  
a situation in which one individual is sentenced to a period of 
confinement at a relatively safe, well-managed prison, complete 
with tennis courts and cable television, while another is sentenced to 
a prison characterized by rampant violence and terror. Under such 
circumstances, it is natural to say that the latter individual was 
subject to a more extreme punishment.
89
  
 
 
 87. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 859 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 88. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991).  
 89. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 855 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The quoted passage doesn’t refer to the 
different effects on different individuals of the same set of sanctions, but rather to the differences 
across institutions at which individuals may serve their sentences. Both types of comparison rest on the 
experience of punishment. 
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But can mass criminal justice systems be expected to conduct inquiries 
into the way each person subjectively experiences the sanctions imposed 
upon him or her? And the shortcomings of the experientialist approach are 
not limited to its impracticality. Rather than being sensitive to equal 
protection concerns, individualized criteria for findings of punishment 
would open the floodgates to distinctions on the basis of differences in ex 
ante levels of refinement, comfort, cultivation, sensibility, and sense of 
entitlement.  
The more privileged the life a convict has led, the more he will suffer 
from the imposition of a particular set of sanctions. Correspondingly, the 
purview of constitutional review would, arguably, afford him greater 
protection than it would those with less privileged ex ante lives. It would, 
in short, tend to perpetuate unequal hedonistic baselines. This is not, 
however, the reason why the Supreme Court has rejected experientialism, 
at least since State of Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber (1947).
90
 The 
reason rests, rather, with the Court’s insistence on a finding of mens rea on 
the part of the agent of punishment. Only where “wanton infliction of 
pain” was present, the Court has held, could violation of the Eighth 
Amendment be found, “regardless,” (in the Wilson language) “of the 
actual suffering inflicted.”91  
Intentionalism
92
 fares better than experientialism, but only slightly. It is 
more robust because it is impossible to properly interpret any practice, 
including punishment, without questioning the meaning ascribed to it by 
those involved in the practice itself. Hence, the point of punishment cannot 
be ascertained without an investigation into the purposes that state agents 
who distribute sanctions have in mind. That investigation is inextricable 
from mentalist considerations about the intentions of such agents when 
they engage in punitive courses of action. Thus, the Supreme Court’s 
choice in Wilson to look to “intention” rather than “structure” was a choice 
for ontological intentionalism in the definition of punishment. The 
Supreme Court’s preference for intentionalism is also reflected in the 
treatment of the state of mind requirement for findings of cruelty under the 
Eighth Amendment: “[a]n intent requirement is implicit [in the Eighth 
Amendment] ban on cruel and unusual punishment.”93  
 
 
 90. See State of Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947). 
 91. Id.; Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991). 
 92. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 25–42 (1998) [hereinafter 
FLETCHER, CONCEPTS]. 
 93. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 294 (emphasis omitted) (petitioner alleging cumulative effect of prison 
conditions—overcrowding, noise, insufficient locker space, inadequate heating and cooling, overall 
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An intentionalist conception of punishment is adequate only where it is 
most promising—that is, at the macro or system-wide level of punishment 
where, for instance, intention on the part of a legislative body to enact a 
form of punishment or widespread practice that operates under the 
convention that it is indeed engaged in punishment. At this level of 
generality and pattern-producing effects, intentionalism translates into 
quasi-objectivism. It is true, though counterintuitive, that the more 
objective intentionalism is rendered in this sense, the more promising it is 
from a definitional standpoint.  
At the macro level, intentionalism connects concrete individualized 
punishments to the myriad decisions of all branches of government that, 
over time, put in place a particular criminal justice system. Those 
decisions are best understood as a series of cumulative policy choices. As 
Justice Blackmun stated in his Farmer concurrence: 
When a sheriff or a marshall [sic] takes a man from the courthouse 
in a prison van and transports him to confinement . . . this is our act. 
We have tolled the bell for him. And whether we like it or not, we 
have made him our collective responsibility. We are free to do 
something about him; he is not.
94
  
Intentionalism thus clarifies a limited but profoundly important point 
about constitutional politics: constitutional orders choose to punish 
specified conduct, and they choose to punish it in some specific ways. 
Every time a public official sends someone into confinement or keeps him 
there because of his conduct, that macro choice at the level of the criminal 
justice system is renewed at the individual level.  
Structuralism best articulates the ontology of punishment, advancing a 
version of objectivism that is illuminated by manageable concessions to 
subjectivism. Let us approach the structuralist view indirectly at first, 
again using doctrines of the United States Supreme Court as example.  
The Court has disfavored a wholesale use of structuralism in the 
definition of punishment. This rejection is most clear in the position the 
Court takes on the punitive nature of civil confinement. In Kansas v. 
Hendricks (1997)
95
 and Seling v. Young (2001),
96
 plaintiffs claimed that 
 
 
unsanitary conditions, and housing with mentally and physically ill inmates—constituted cruel 
punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment). 
 94. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 854 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 95. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (affirming constitutionality of civil 
confinement under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act).  
 96. See Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001) (upholding constitutionality of State of 
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Kansas and Washington civil confinement acts were punitive as applied to 
them. The Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that legislation found to 
impose civil consequences could not be punitive in nature, regardless of 
the concrete restrictions imposed.
97
 Following this logic, the Court decided 
that civil statutes raise no questions of constitutional punishment. For 
instance, protections under the doctrines of double jeopardy, ex post facto 
law and punishment, or Eighth Amendment cruelty do not apply to civil 
confinement.
98
  
Courts that follow this view are wrong, both as a matter of law and of 
policy. And most do follow it. However, it is still open to courts to adopt 
structuralism as a path of jurisprudential progress. Let me indicate how. 
Confinement is the principal, though sometimes only latent, restriction 
criminal justice systems impose as punishment. The primary impact that 
involuntary confinement has on those subjected to it is a generalized 
coerced vulnerability. As we know, not all types of involuntary 
confinement and consequent vulnerability can be considered punishment 
constitutionally speaking. At this point, structuralism is ready to be 
complemented by intentionalism to the extent that it identifies the point, in 
terms of stated or presumed objectives, of episodes of confinement. 
Intentionalism’s contribution becomes relevant in that according to it only 
restrictions chosen by the state as a matter of criminal justice policy as 
sanction for the violation of its laws are punishment.  
The mutually supportive relationship between intentionalism and 
structuralism may be further explained with an example from the literature 
on the topic. H.L.A. Hart’s well-known definition of the “central case” of 
punishment has five necessary elements: (i) “pain or other consequences 
normally considered unpleasant”; (ii) “for an offence against legal rules”; 
(iii) “of an actual or supposed offender for his offence”; (iv) “intentionally 
administered by human beings other than the offender”; and (v) “imposed 
and administered by an authority constituted by a legal system against 
which the offence is committed.”99  
 
 
Washington’s Community Protection Act). 
 97. For a rigorous and insightful discussion of the problem of intentionality and moral 
permissibility in this context, see Vincent Chiao, Punishment and Permissibility in the Criminal Law, 
32 L. & PHIL 729 (2013). 
 98. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977). In Ingraham, a school discipline case in 
which the Court found the Eighth Amendment non-applicable outside punishment for crime, the Court 
reasoned that the Eighth Amendment limits the criminal justice system in three dimensions: (1) what 
conducts can be criminalized, (2) what types of punishment can be inflicted, and (3) the necessary 
proportionality between crime and punishment. 
 99. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 4–5 
(2008). 
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In Hart’s ontology of punishment, intentionalist and structuralist 
components combine. The requirements designated by the phrases, “[f]or 
an offense” and “intentionally administered,” refer to the state of mind of 
key agents in the imposition of punishment.
100
 It is because these agents, 
acting under the authority of law, ascribe the meaning of punishment to 
the restrictions they impose on others, that we are able to interpret their 
punitive practice as such, thus distinguishing that practice from other 
forms of legal sanction and extra-legal retribution. Furthermore, in Hart’s 
definition, the intentionalist element is the link between offense and 
punishment, whereby the latter is seen as legal retribution for the 
former.
101
 But if this were the end of the story we would be back to the 
shortcomings of intentionalism discussed above. At this point 
structuralism comes to the rescue. The combined “unpleasant” 
consequences of official punitive choices create the structural predicament 
of coerced vulnerability. The central ontological case of punishment is 
therefore to be found in the coerced vulnerability that punitive intentions 
engender.  
Punishment is a key manifestation of the authority and power of the 
state in the creation of vulnerability through asymmetrical dependency. 
The ordinary relationship between individuals and the state is of course 
predicated on overwhelming power asymmetry.
102
 How much more, then, 
is this asymmetry increased when individuals are stripped, by the 
deployment of punitive power, not only of multiple fundamental rights, 
but also, in many cases, of initiative and control over the most basic needs 
of life? The restrictions that this vulnerability imposes on those who come 
under it are often crushing. In the words of the Supreme Court, “[t]o 
incarcerate, society takes from prisoners the means to provide for their 
own needs. Prisoners are dependent on the [s]tate for food, clothing, and 
necessary medical care.” The Court also added that “[a] prison that 
deprives prisoners of basic sustenance, including adequate medical care, is 
incompatible with the concept of human dignity and has no place in 
civilized society.”103 
Robert Goodin has shown that relationships of dependency or 
vulnerability are morally objectionable if they meet four criteria: (i) “[t]he 
 
 
 100. Id. State of mind includes both motivation and intention. 
 101. For an interpretation of H. L. A. Hart’s concept of punishment in light of constitutional 
doctrine, see FLETCHER, CONCEPTS, supra note 92, at 25–42 (arguing for necessity to appeal to 
motivationism as way to get to what I have been calling point of punishment).  
 102.  Even for the most resourceful individual members of most states, their private power is no 
match for the instruments of power states have at their disposal or can mobilize if needed.  
 103. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011). 
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relationship embodies an asymmetrical balance of power”; (ii) “[t]he 
subordinate party needs the resources provided by the relationship in order 
to protect his vital interests”; (iii) “[f]or the subordinate party, the 
relationship is the only source of such resources”; and (iv) “[t]he 
superordinate party in the relationship exercises discretionary control over 
those resources.”104 When the relationship fails to meet any of these 
criteria, Goodin adds, “our moral objection to the relationship is 
diminished.”105  
Consider once again confinement, the archetypical case of modern 
punishment.
106
 Punishment of individuals always involves or can be 
resolved in confinement. When confined as punishment, individuals 
become dependent upon the state and its agents for the most basic 
necessities of life, such as movement, relationships, nutrition, shelter, 
hygiene, health care, rest, and safety. Some of these specific necessities, 
such as security of the person and property, have independent 
constitutional status. Others are usually regulated at the infra-
constitutional level or left to the discretion of parole and prison officials. 
In any event, in the context of confinement, the state has de jure or at least 
de facto monopoly over resources to meet such basic needs. Moreover, the 
discretion of the state and its agents over allocation of and access to 
monopolized resources that meet basic needs of prisoners is large, albeit 
not unlimited as a matter of law. And wherever the state’s monopoly is 
broken by the intrusion of alternative forms of resource access (such as 
bribery, underground markets, gang affiliation, etc.), the vulnerability of 
prisoners is increased rather than decreased.  
Once we accept that coerced vulnerability is integral to punishment and 
that it creates moral and political-constitutional obligations on the part of 
the state, the next step is to assess penal incidents and circumstances that 
prima facie are of questionable legitimacy as instantiations of 
constitutional punishment.
107
 
 
 
 104. ROBERT E. GOODIN, PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE: A REANALYSIS OF OUR SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES 195–96 (1985). 
 105. Id. at 196. 
 106. All punishment involves the creation of some form of vulnerability, even if it is restricted to 
financial or reputational vulnerability. These other punishments deserve attention that cannot be given 
in this Article. 
 107. That is the case even where, say, illegitimate impacts of the coerced vulnerability are 
revealed only after punishment ceases. In such cases remedies required by legitimate constitutional 
punishment would be due as far as proximate or remote causes of undue harm can be traced back to 
the coerced vulnerability of punishment.  
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The emphasis on structuralism complemented by intentionalism 
informs an ontology of punishment that improves on prevailing 
constitutional doctrines, serving as basis for the reconstruction of 
punishment as a central constitutional institution in liberal democracies. 
Under the reconstructed definition I propose, punishment is a sanction 
imposed by state agents for norm violation that directly imposes, requires, 
or may result in a structural predicament characterized by generalized 
coerced vulnerability vis-à-vis the state and its agents. 
With punishment thus redefined, three related constitutional questions 
remain. First, what are the merits of the idea, espoused by constitutional 
doctrines everywhere, that legitimate penological objectives may render 
constitutionally legitimate sanctioning schemes or practices that would 
otherwise not belong in a constitution? Second, and considering how 
repellent cruelty is deemed to be in liberal democratic constitutionalism, 
whether any particular instance of cruelty can ever be constitutional? 
Third, how punishment vitiated by cruelty is to be remedied under the 
principle that punishment failing to satisfy the other four reconstructive 
principles of constitutional punishment must be fully redressable? Any 
sound answer to these questions will have to traverse the integrative 
territory where constitutional politics and constitutional morality meet. To 
this path I now turn. 
2. Penological Purposes and Moral Agency in Punishment 
The analysis in Part I expounded the tendency of reactive constitutional 
punishment doctrine to find cruelty only when brutality and suffering are 
penologically inexpedient and shocking to society’s standards of 
decency.
108
 In Farmer, I have noted, the United States Supreme Court held 
that “gratuitously allowing the beating or rape of one prisoner by another 
serves no legitimate penological objective . . . .”109 The implication here is 
clear. Were a legitimate punitive objective present, the existence of such a 
legitimate purpose would weaken, if not altogether disallow, rights claims 
under legal protections of bodily integrity and against cruelty.
110
 This 
doctrinal tendency is mistaken as a matter of both law and morality.  
 
 
 108. I leave aside the question of an independent proportionality standard under the Eighth 
Amendment.  
 109. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 110. Indeed, penological objectives excuse deprivation and suffering all the time in case law. This 
jurisprudence would also condemn deprivation that “may result in pain and suffering which no one 
suggests would serve any penological purpose.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (citing 
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That only punishment that can be shown to meet penologically 
legitimate purposes may be inflicted is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition of legitimate constitutional punishment. In this section I argue 
that the argumentative resources of deontologist and consequentialist 
justifications of punishment run out before either can fully justify 
peremptory bans on cruelty, thus ill serving the principle that state 
violence in the form of punishment ought to be conceived and practiced as 
cruelty-free. Indeed, nothing in deontologism or consequentialism 
completely rules out cruel punishment; sometimes these theories even 
seem to require it. The prima facie compatibility of legitimate penological 
objectives and cruelty rests on the fact that none of the recognized 
penological objectives fully incorporates the principle of human dignity.
111
  
To understand the complex justificatory landscape where punishment, 
equality, freedom, and dignity intersect, we must consider two levels of 
moral justifications for punishment. The first and more abstract level 
concerns the justification of public intervention as conducive to the liberty 
and security of individuals generally. The second and more specific level 
addresses the justification of that intervention in its punishment subtype. 
The latter is then a special case of the former. Although the analytical and 
practical differences between these two levels are clear, their importance 
has often eluded traditional constitutional punishment doctrines.  
Focusing on the first order level of justification, three different but not 
necessarily incompatible types of arguments are usually provided to 
support public interference with individual liberty: the harm principle, the 
surrogacy or paternalistic principle, and the social morality principle.  
The harm principle justifies interference with the agent’s liberty 
interests when her conduct causes or is (significantly) likely to cause 
relevant harm to others.
112
 It is important to note that the harm principle, 
 
 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182–83 (1976)). Justice Scalia picks up this thread in his majority 
opinion in Wilson v. Seiter. 510 U.S. 294, 296–306 (1991). 
 111. I will show infra that a sound conception of cruelty depends in part upon a clear 
understanding of severe disrespect to human dignity.  
 112. As John Stuart Mill writes:  
[The] principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or 
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. 
That the only purpose for which can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or 
moral, is not a sufficient warrant. . . . The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is 
amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, 
his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the 
individual is sovereign. 
JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 14 (John Gray ed., Oxford Univ. 
Press 1998). See also JOHN STUART MILL, Considerations on Representative Government, in ON 
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strictly speaking, only justifies obstructive intervention. The logic behind 
this principle does not ordinarily justify ex post facto intervention, for 
even justification based on the deterrent or preventive effects of the 
intervention would have to meet two stringent criteria. First, the means of 
deterrence or prevention has to be specific, acting upon, and solely upon, 
the agent likely to cause or causing harm to others. Further, second, the 
deterrent or preventive effect of the intervention would have to be not only 
possible, but certain.
113
 Here retributive or utilitarian arguments, none of 
which is intrinsic to the logic of the harm principle, would have to be 
imported. 
The surrogacy principle
114
 justifies intervention limiting the liberty of 
individuals in order to prevent or obstruct self-inflicted harm or self-
created vulnerability to harms potentially and unintentionally caused by 
others. In this case, intervention is justified because the person suffering it 
will ultimately be better off as a result of the intervention.
115
 Because the 
surrogacy principle only justifies obstructive or preventive intervention 
(such as to compel someone to wear a helmet and use a seat-belt), no one, 
after being self-harmed or harmed because of a self-inflicted condition of 
vulnerability, would be better off as a result of suffering additional harm in 
the form of paternalistic intrusion on her liberty interests, let alone when 
this intervention comes in the form of punishment.
116
  
As with the harm principle, the logic behind the surrogacy principle 
does not justify ex post facto intervention, except when justifications 
based on the deterrent effects of the intervention can meet three criteria, 
which are even more stringent than those required by the harm principle. 
First, deterrence has to be specific. That is, the agent deterred has to be the 
one potentially self-harmed or self-made vulnerable to harm by others. 
 
 
LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 205 (John Gray ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998). 
 113. Of course, the mere threat of punishment may have important deterrent effects and therefore 
make prima facie plausible the argument that the “harm principle” would recognize a reason for 
threatening punishment and, by extension, for deterrence. The argument fails, simply, in finding within 
the logic of the harm principle an authorization to consider legitimate utilitarian interference with 
individual freedom (i.e., “let’s threaten in order to deter”). The harm principle, as introduced by Mill, 
is not a tool to reduce crime; its utilitarian justification is in its fitness or usefulness in creating a social 
environment that fosters the production of means for greater happiness. 
 114. Or “paternalistic,” as Gerald Dworkin and most of the literature name it. 
 115. The classical formulation is found in Dworkin: “[b]y paternalism I shall understand roughly 
the interference with a person’s liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the 
welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or values of the person being coerced.” Gerald Dworkin, 
Paternalism, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 271, 271 (Joel Feinberg & Jules Coleman eds., 1999).  
 116. But if one considers that such harm could prevent future self-harming, then loyalty to the 
logic of the principle would require one to classify this harm as a forward-looking preventive 
intervention, and not as a backward-looking harm or punishment. 
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Second, the deterrent effect must also be at least highly probable, if not 
certain. Finally, third, the intervention would have to be significantly less 
harmful than the self-inflicted harm or condition of vulnerability.
117
 Here 
again, retributivist and utilitarian arguments extraneous to the logic of the 
surrogacy principle would have to be imported, with particularly 
disturbing consequences. 
Finally, some have offered the social morality principle as justification 
for public intervention in individual freedom.
118
 This principle justifies 
society or state-sponsored intrusion in the lives of individuals either to act 
upon them or to act upon society though them. More specifically, under 
this model, public intervention acts upon individuals with the aim of 
leading them, frequently through punishment, to the internalization of and 
compliance with hegemonic morality. Public intervention may 
alternatively act by obstructing or deterring social agents from engaging in 
courses of action contrary to the standards of public decency that they 
perhaps resist, thus reinforcing those standards at both symbolic and 
enforcement levels. Public intervention acts upon society when it 
expresses, confirms, and reinforces hegemonic morality, thus playing an 
important role in the social and cultural reproduction of that morality.  
Unlike the two preceding principles, the logic of the social morality 
principle invites ex post facto intrusion in addition to ex ante obstructive 
and preventive intrusion. Whenever intervention is more effective than 
non-intervention in fostering elements of hegemonic social morality, such 
intervention is justified. Clearly, consequentialist arguments lie at the core 
of the logic of social morality. 
One obvious question that the political theory of constitutional 
punishment raises in relation to the social morality approach is who 
 
 
 117. Dworkin proposes less stringent principles restricting paternalistic intervention:  
I suggest in closing two principles designed to achieve this end. 
In all cases of paternalistic legislation there must be a heavy and clear burden of proof placed 
on the authorities to demonstrate the exact nature of the harmful effects (or beneficial 
consequences) to be avoided (or achieved) and the probability of their occurrence. The burden 
of proof here is twofold—what lawyers distinguish as the burden of going forward and the 
burden of persuasion. That the authorities have the burden of going forward means that it is 
up to them to raise the question and bring forward evidence of the evils to be avoided. . . . In 
addition the nature and cogency of the evidence for the harmfulness of the course of action 
must be set at a high level. . . . 
Finally I suggest a principle of the least restrictive alternative. If there is an alternative way of 
accomplishing the desired end without restricting liberty although it may involve great 
expense, inconvenience, et cetera, the society must adopt it. 
Dworkin, supra note 115, at 280. 
 118. The classical locus of the principle in contemporary criminal law is the work of PATRICK 
DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965). 
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determines what is moral for whom. Who is to be the judge? In the United 
States, constitutional doctrine has struggled to determine where, at any 
particular point in time, we look to discover the evolving standards of 
social morality. On its face, one may think that there are actually two 
distinct questions here. The first concerns what public morality prescribes. 
The second concerns what moral wrongs are injurious to society. Patrick 
Devlin, and the United States Supreme Court in some criminal cases, 
conflate the two categories. Everything that is morally wrong, it will 
follow from the conflation, is also potentially injurious to society. Thus, 
what seemed to be a double test is really a single one—the “average-
citizen test” of public morality. There is no guarantee of protection for 
liberty interests independent of the average-citizen’s moral sensibility.119 
The three traditional principles that seek to justify public intervention 
in individual lives fail seriously. But even if one were successful in 
making a general case for public intrusion in the lives of individuals, the 
punitive kind of intervention would still require specific, first order 
justification. Every punishment is a form of public intervention in the 
freedom and security rights of individuals under liberal democratic 
constitutions. While public intervention in general is almost always 
unwelcome and unpleasant, it is not necessarily harmful beyond those 
inconveniences. Public intervention is, one might say, an inevitable and 
yet affordable price constitutions exact in the name of order and other 
social coordination objectives. Punishment, in contrast, is by nature 
harmful beyond mere inconvenience or obstruction.  
A necessary qualification of this two-level justificatory process is that 
there must be logical consistency between the upper and lower levels of 
justification. The general justification for governmental intervention in 
individual lives cannot be at odds with the justification for any concrete 
punishment inflicted.  
Classical retributivist and utilitarian justifications of punishment 
include retribution for offenses, socialization or re-socialization of 
offenders, protection of social order and the safety of individuals (to be 
achieved by punishing actual offenders and by obstructing or deterring 
potential offenders), and expression of socially dominant morality.  
 
 
 119. An example given by Devlin is homosexuality: 
There is, for example, a general abhorrence of homosexuality. We should ask ourselves in the 
first instance whether, looking at it calmly and dispassionately, we regard it as a vice so 
abominable that its mere presence is an offence. If that is the genuine feeling of the society in 
which we live, I do not see how society can be denied the right to eradicate it. 
Id. at 17. 
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Retributivism appeals to a sense of proportion between a past harmful 
event and a future legal consequence triggered by it. The requirement of 
proportionality to a harmful event in the past means that the past event 
establishes, at the same time, the minimum and maximum limit of the 
retribution. In the case of punishment for crime, the retributive role of 
punishment is to return to the offender a harm commensurate to the one 
she caused. According to this conception of retributivism, the more 
accurately punishment reflects the offense that triggered it, the more just it 
is. Thus, retributivism is a justificatory argument connected to past 
conduct. Any consideration of the future consequences of punishment is 
alien to the logic of retributivism.
120
 
In the history of criminal law, retributivism has been motivated by one 
or more of the following aims: (i) vengeance, where the core element is 
the state of mind of those linked to the retribution either as victim of the 
offense or as state officials acting as proxies of the victim; 
(ii) compensation, where the core element is an attempt to reestablish the 
status quo ante; (iii) annulment, where the rationale is an attempt to 
ideally heal, annul, or atone for the violation of the legal or moral order, 
rendering it once again unblemished;
121
 and, finally, (iv) satisfaction of 
 
 
 120. Once again, in Kant’s formulation we read:  
Judicial Punishment can never be used merely as a means to promote some other good for the 
criminal himself or for civil society, but instead it must in all cases be imposed on him only 
on the ground that he has committed a crime; for a human being can never be manipulated 
merely as a means to the purposes of someone else and can never be confused with the 
objects of the Law of things [Sachenrecht] . . . The law concerning punishment is a 
categorical imperative, and woe to him who rummages around in the winding paths of a 
theory of happiness looking for some advantage to be gained by releasing the criminal from 
punishment or by reducing the amount of it . . .  
IMMANUEL KANT, The Metaphysics of Morals, in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY (Mary J. Gregor ed. & 
trans., 1996) (1797); KANT, JUSTICE, supra note 6. It is important to note that every actual retributivist 
theory (including Kant's) includes a caveat excluding punishments that are incompatible with personal 
dignity. Some, like that of R.A. Duff, characterize punishment as designed to promote personal 
autonomy, thus inherently precluding punishments that are incompatible with it (though Duff’s is more 
a moral reform theory than a retributivist one). 
 121. Hegel, building on Kant’s views on the matter, gives the classical formulation of retributive 
idealism:  
The infringement of right as right is something that happens and has positive existence in the 
external world, though inherently it is nothing at all. The manifestation of its nullity is the 
appearance, also in the external world, of the annihilation of the infringement. This is the 
right actualized, the necessity of the right mediating itself with itself by annulling what has 
infringed it. . . .  
[T]he injury from the point of view of the particular will of the injured party and of onlookers 
is only something negative. The sole positive existence which the injury possesses is that it is 
the particular will of the criminal. Hence to injure or penalize this particular will as a will 
determinately existent is to annul the crime, which otherwise would have been valid, and to 
restore the right.  
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social indignation, where the central characteristic is a general state of 
mind that bases blameworthiness on hegemonic morality. But however its 
motivation is conceived—to avenge, to compensate, to annul, or to 
express—retributivism is committed to proportionality between offense 
and retribution.  
In contrast, utilitarianism looks forward. Broadly speaking, 
utilitarianism bases its assessment of conduct on the probability that such 
conduct will produce certain outcomes. Whether a course of action is 
justified depends upon its propensity to bring about desirable outcomes or 
avert undesirable ones. Although the evaluation of some outcomes as more 
desirable than others lies in the past, the outcome itself and the conduct 
conducive to it necessarily lie ahead. Any attempt to condition the 
justification of any course of action on an event in the past is alien to the 
utilitarian justificatory system. The future is the time of utilitarianism, and 
efficiency its ruler.  
According to Jeremy Bentham, utilitarianism uses punishment as a tool 
to achieve four objects: (i) “to prevent . . . all sorts of offences 
whatsoever”; (ii) “to induce [an offender] to commit an offence less 
mischievous, rather than one more mischievous”; (iii) “[w]hen a man has 
resolved upon a particular offence, the object is to dispose him to do no 
more mischief than is necessary to his purpose”; and, finally, 
(iv) “whatever the mischief be, . . . to prevent it at as cheap a rate as 
possible.”122 To achieve these objectives, punishment is subject to a series 
of rules, which Bentham thus articulates: (i) “[t]he value of the 
punishment must not be less in any case than what is sufficient to 
outweigh that of the profit of the offence”;123 (ii) “[t]o enable the value of 
the punishment to outweigh that of the profit of the offence, it must be 
increased, in point of magnitude, in proportion as it falls short in point of 
certainty”; (iii) “[p]unishment must be further increased in point of 
magnitude, in proportion as it falls in point of proximity”;124 (iv) “[w]hen a 
 
 
HEGEL, supra note 2, at 69 (internal citation and marks omitted). Hegel goes on to write, “[t]he 
annulment of the crime is retribution in so far as (a) retribution in conception is an ‘injury of the 
injury,’ and (b) since as existent a crime is something determinate in its scope both qualitatively and 
quantitatively, its negation as existent is similarly determinate.” Id. at 71. See generally HEGEL, supra 
note 2.  
 122. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 
165 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (internal footnote omitted). For a 
defense of utilitarianism in punishment, see Mirko Bagaric, In Defence of a Utilitarian Theory of 
Punishment: Punishing the Innocent and the Compatibility of Utilitarianism and Rights, 24 AUSTL. J. 
LEG. PHIL. 95 (1999).  
 123. BENTHAM, supra note 123, at 166 (internal footnotes omitted). 
 124. Id. at 170.  
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punishment, which in point of quality is particularly well calculated to 
answer its intention, cannot exist in less than a certain quantity, it may 
sometimes be of use, for the sake of employing it, to stretch a little beyond 
that quantity which, on other accounts, would be strictly necessary”; and, 
finally, (v) “[i]n particular, this may sometimes be the case, where the 
punishment proposed is of such a nature as to be particularly well 
calculated to answer the purpose of a moral lesson.”125  
Placed in the broader context of the history of criminal law, utilitarian 
justifications of punishment have taken the following forms: education, 
where the aim of punishment is to educate or reeducate the offender 
(rehabilitation through socialization); security, either by removing the 
offenders’ material conditions to offend (incapacitation) or by 
undermining the actual or potential offenders’ calculations otherwise 
favoring crime (special and general deterrence); and expression, where 
what is being expressed is any value promoted by majorities or by a 
relevant elite with access to the means of punishment (such as lustration, 
shaming, etc.). 
To briefly recapitulate, punishment is a special kind of public intrusion 
in the lives of individuals. As such, punishment must pass two tests to be 
morally justified. First, punishment must meet the moral justification for 
general public intervention with individuals’ otherwise constitutionally 
protected prerogatives. Second, punishment must meet the moral 
justification for the infliction upon individuals of the particular form of 
harm constituted by punishment. Arguments for each of these tests fall 
into families, which can then be organized to form two levels of a 
justificatory system, each corresponding to one of the tests. The two levels 
of justification have a complementary relationship to each other, a 
relationship qualified by the requirement of non-contradiction. 
 
 
 125. Id. at 171 (internal footnote omitted).  
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 Harm 
Principle 
Surrogacy 
Principle  
Social Morality 
Principle 
Retributive 
Vengeance 
(1) inconsistent (8) inconsistent (15) inconsistent 
Retributive 
Compensation 
(2) inconsistent (9) inconsistent (16) inconsistent 
Retributive 
Annulment 
(3) inconsistent (10) inconsistent (17) inconsistent 
Retributive 
Expression 
(4) inconsistent (11) inconsistent (18) consistent 
Utilitarian 
Reeducation 
(5) consistent (12) consistent (19) consistent 
Utilitarian 
Social Safety 
(6) consistent (13) consistent (20) consistent 
Utilitarian 
Expression 
(7) inconsistent (14) inconsistent (21) consistent 
A table may help visualize consistencies and inconsistencies in the 
interactions between the two levels of arguments. The arguments of the 
more abstract justificatory level run along the top axis: the harm principle 
(HP), the surrogacy or paternalistic principle (SP), and the social morality 
principle (SMP). Of the lower justificatory level the following illustrative 
arguments are placed down the left axis: retributive vengeance (RV), 
retributive compensation (RC), retributive annulment (RA), retributive 
expression (RE), utilitarian reeducation (UE), utilitarian social safety 
(US), and utilitarian expression (UEX). 
The table shows succinctly that the harm and surrogacy principles do 
not justify, except with the most stringent requirements as discussed 
above, the ex post facto intervention which characterizes retribution. Cells 
7 and 14 show that utilitarian expressionism does not meet the 
requirements for ex post facto enforcement of the harm and surrogacy 
principles. Moreover, cells 5, 6, 12, and 13 refer to the cases where only 
obstruction or prevention appears to justify a utilitarian aim. Cells 15, 16, 
and 17 are consistent with the conclusion that vengeance, compensation, 
and annulment only indirectly and remotely serve the social morality 
principle. On the other hand, cells 18, 19, 20, and 21 help show why 
retributive expressionism, utilitarian education, utilitarian security, and 
utilitarian expressionism are among the preferred enforcement and 
reproduction devices of hegemonic morality. 
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Thus, punishment may consistently be justified only in the cases of 
cells 5, 6, 12, 13, 18, 19, 20, and 21, which from now on I will refer to as 
the consistent lineages of justification of punishment. With these lineages 
in mind, I now turn to the question of whether they are in line with the 
principle that state violence in the form of punishment ought to be 
conceived and practiced as cruelty-free. If they are not, then the adequate 
role that penological objectives may play in the foundations of 
constitutional punishment needs to be redimensioned.  
There are two questions here, or rather two sides to the same question. 
The first is whether any of the consistent lineages of justification for any 
given penologically legitimate punishment is able to offer sufficient reason 
to show that cruel punishment is impermissible. If the consistent lineages 
of justification for punishment render morally legitimate a punishment that 
should otherwise be considered cruel in light of constitutional principles, 
then appealing to those lineages has very limited constitutional 
significance. In this case, one must conclude that legitimate penological 
objectives do not command a sufficiently comprehensive treatment of the 
problems of cruel punishment.
126
 A comprehensive treatment of the 
problem of cruel punishment would require different conceptions of both 
punishment and cruelty.
127
 The complementary question is then what role 
remains in the foundations of constitutional punishment for considerations 
of penological legitimacy. 
It turns out that it is not difficult to answer the first question of whether 
consistent lineages of justification of punishment allow, disallow, or 
remain neutral in relation to cruelty. In the cases of cells 5 and 6, there is 
nothing intrinsic to the logic of these lineages of justification that would 
lead to a ban on cruelty whenever cruelty promises efficiency in achieving 
reeducation or social safety. The lineages of justification appearing in cells 
12 and 13 do provide some justification for the prohibition of cruelty, 
except when society, the law, or the courts prescribes values for individual 
life that are regarded as superior to abstention from cruelty, in which case 
cruelty as a means of promoting those values would be justifiable. Turning 
to cells 18 through 21 (where what is at stake is whether the social 
 
 
 126. The claim here is not that we are unable to achieve a comfortable social consensus on matters 
relating to punishment. By and large, and for better or worse, we have. Social consensus is not a by-
product of the consistency and soundness of moral or legal theories, but rather the combination of 
practices, beliefs, history, and less demanding discursive practices. What I am saying is that our 
current moral and legal theories have an important gap that cannot be closed by the mere logical 
extension of their indwelling dominant principles. 
 127. See Barrozo, Punishing Cruelly, supra note 15; Barrozo, Jurisprudence of Cruelty, supra 
note 15. 
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morality principle can be served by retributive expressionism, utilitarian 
reeducation, utilitarian social safety, or utilitarian expressionism), the 
answer here cannot be given a priori. The answer depends upon the 
predominant social morality, among other factors. What is clear, though, is 
that if other values are ranked higher than human dignity and the 
repudiation of brutality, then cruel means to achieve retributive 
expressionism, utilitarian reeducation, utilitarian social safety, or 
utilitarian expressionism would be justified, insofar as they do not shock 
the dominant social morality. This much is implied in the United States 
Supreme Court’s reliance upon legitimate penological objectives in cruel 
punishment heuristics.  
An unavoidable conclusion emerges from this analysis. The principle 
that punishment ought to be conceived and practiced as cruelty-free cannot 
hinge on traditionally justified penological purposes.  
What, then, is the role of inquiry into legitimate penological objectives 
in the foundations of constitutional punishment? One of the five principles 
of the reconstruction of constitutional punishment is that affirmation of 
human dignity through punishment entails that punishment ought both to 
meet morally justified penological objectives and to take seriously the 
moral agency of those subject to it. This principle indicates a primarily 
negative role for legitimate penological purposes. Any punishment that 
lacks a legitimate penological objective has no place on the constitutional 
stage. However, the moral justification of punishment also has a positive 
role to play in the integrative theory. Unless punishment serves legitimate 
penological objectives, even if it is not cruel, it also has no place in liberal 
democratic constitutionalism, for punishing someone for banal aims is not 
an acceptable deployment of state violence.  
B. Cruelty in the Practice and Regulative Ideals of Punishment 
If punishment is to be embraced by liberal democracies as one of their 
core constitutional practices, punishment must find constitutional 
foundations that include but are not to be reduced to penologically 
legitimate ends. One such constitutional foundation is that punishment be 
conceived as cruelty-free and practiced under this regulative ideal. Only 
then would respect for individuals as the embodiment of human dignity 
actively be affirmed through punishment. 
In an important methodological passage in A Theory of Justice, John 
Rawls explains the relationship that moral theory must keep with what he 
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calls our “moral capacity.”128 This capacity is the basic intellectual 
equipment that allows individuals to evaluate conduct, facts, events, 
characters, states of affairs, and institutional arrangements in moral terms. 
“Now,” writes Rawls: 
[O]ne may think of moral theory at first . . . as the attempt to 
describe our moral capacity . . . . By such a description is not meant 
simply a list of the judgments on institutions and actions that we are 
prepared to render . . . . Rather, what is required is a formulation of 
a set of principles which, when conjoined to our beliefs and 
knowledge of the circumstances, would lead us to make these 
judgments with their supporting reasons were we to apply these 
principles conscientiously and intelligently.
129
 
The theory of cruelty faces a similar challenge, one that, as in the case of 
Rawls’ theory of justice, has moral as well as political implications.  
The first task in the redefinition of cruelty is no doubt to design a 
conceptual landscape capacious enough to overlap with the diversity of 
phenomena that moral capacity rejects as cruel. But this conceptual 
landscape would have to be such that it not only captures the full expanse 
of the moral capacity to find cruelty in the world, but also illuminates and 
empowers this capacity, raising it to higher levels of understanding of the 
moral entailments of findings of cruelty. In liberal democratic 
constitutionalism, findings of cruelty and their moral entailments already 
have constitutional stature. The task is to gain clarity about and to deepen 
the commitment of constitutionalism to the rejection of cruelty in 
punishment.   
Definitions of cruelty in constitutional doctrine and history of legal 
thought combine objective and subjective elements, revealing the interplay 
of four conceptions of cruelty that distinctively select and combine these 
elements. I label these conceptions agent-objective, agent-subjective, 
victim-subjective, and agent-independent/victim-objective.
130
 This section 
 
 
 128. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999). Richard Rorty, abandoning all 
pretensions to rationally-coerced universalism, nonetheless assigns a similar task to philosophy when 
he says “the most philosophy can hope to do is to summarize our culturally influenced intuitions about 
the right thing to do in various situations,” adding that those who share this view “see the point of 
formulating such summarizing generalizations as increasing the predictability, and thus the power and 
efficiency, of our institutions, thereby heightening the sense of shared moral identity that brings us 
together in a moral community.” RICHARD RORTY, Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality, in 
3 TRUTH AND PROGRESS: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 167, 171 (1998). 
 129. RAWLS, supra note 129, at 41.   
 130. See Barrozo, Punishing Cruelly, supra note 15; Barozzo, Jurisprudence of Cruelty, supra 
note 15. 
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argues that only the context-sensitive application of these four conceptions 
is able to match the condemnation of cruelty.  
1. Agent-Objective Cruelty  
In his concurring opinion in Wilson, Justice White, interpreting the line 
of prison conditions cases to date in American constitutional law, 
concluded that, “[i]n truth, intent simply is not very meaningful when 
considering a challenge to an institution, such as a prison system.”131 In 
Furman, the Court expressed the view that: 
[T]he history of the Eighth Amendment confirm[s] beyond doubt 
that the death penalty was considered to be a constitutionally 
permissible punishment. It is, however, within the historic process 
of constitutional adjudication to challenge the imposition of the 
death penalty in some barbaric manner or as a penalty wholly 
disproportionate to a particular criminal act. And in making such a 
judgement in a case before it, a court may consider contemporary 
standards to the extent they are relevant.
132
 
In yet another landmark case, the United States Supreme Court stated, 
“punishment must not be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the 
crime.”133 These passages articulate an agent-objective conception of cruel 
punishment.  
An agent-objective conception of cruelty adopts as a definitional 
criterion the violation of an objective norm of behavior—“standard of 
behavior” or “proportion to the severity of the crime,” for instance—that 
causes great suffering.
134
 According to this conception, the state of mind of 
the agent of cruelty is of secondary importance—“intent simply is not very 
meaningful . . . .”135 In his concurrence in Farmer, Justice Stevens wrote 
that he continued “to believe that a state official may inflict cruel and 
unusual punishment without any improper subjective motivation . . . .”136 
Once a legal norm is breached, causing a victim to suffer considerable 
 
 
 131. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 310 (1991). 
 132. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 420 (1972). 
 133. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (citation omitted). 
 134. As far as I know, Lucius Seneca first expounded this conception in his De Clementia. The 
essay, written in A.D. 55 or 56, was addressed to his pupil, the then young emperor Nero. See 1 
SENECA, MORAL ESSAYS 356 (J.W. Basore trans., 1985). 
 135. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S 825, 857. 
 136. Id. at 858 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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pain, the question of whether the agent’s motivation was “wanton and 
unnecessary”137 carries no definitional weight.  
This may be the conception most familiar to originalist and culturalist 
interpreters of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
For them, “unusual” in the constitutional language does the job of 
referring the interpreter to customary norms of punishment. Subjective 
elements set aside, “unusual” permits exclusively behaviorist findings of 
cruelty. 
In the context of punishment, voluntary mercy and strictness are the 
relevant subjective aspects on the part of the agent. Strictness may 
degenerate into cruelty and mercy into pity. A just punitive system would 
chart a course for strictness and mercy that avoids both cruelty and pity. 
But what makes this conception of cruelty objective is that the test for 
strictness, cruelty, mercifulness, and pity is found in a norm of conduct. 
Accordingly, agent-objective cruelty obtains when the agent of 
punishment causes significant pain while breaching a norm of strictness. 
The agent’s motivation—that is, his harshness or hedonistic interest in the 
pain of the other—becomes irrelevant. Similarly, empathy for the 
suffering of the victim would amount to undue influence of passion over 
reason.
138
  
According to the agent-objective conception, punitive cruelty is that 
which fills the behavioral gap between sufficient and excessive 
punishment as stipulated by a norm of behavior. This understanding of 
cruelty looks to whether penological goals such as retribution, reeducation, 
and deterrence comply with the relevant applicable norms. This 
conception presupposes the victim’s suffering, as long as it results from 
conduct in breach of an objective norm.  
2. Agent-Subjective Cruelty 
Consistent with the previous definition of cruelty, the agent-subjective 
conception also presupposes a suffering victim and necessitates action or 
omission that causes this suffering through the violation of a normative 
standard of behavior. However, under this second conception, cruelty 
occurs only when the deviant behavior is accompanied by the specified 
 
 
 137. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). 
 138. Seneca explains: “[p]ity is a weakness of the mind that is over-much perturbed by suffering, 
and if any one requires it from a wise man, that is very much like requiring him to wail and moan at 
the funeral of strangers.” SENECA, supra note 134, at 443. 
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mens rea.
139
 The mens rea requirement can vary from negligence, to 
purpose, to delight in causing intense suffering.  
To appeal again to the American example, all current Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence related to the responsibility of officials for 
conditions of imprisonment aligns, as seen in the Farmer example, with 
this conception of cruelty:  
The Eighth Amendment outlaws cruel and unusual “punishments,” 
not “conditions,” and the failure to alleviate a significant risk that an 
official should have perceived but did not, while no cause for 
commendation, cannot be condemned as the infliction of 
punishment under the Court’s cases. . . . This Court’s cases 
“mandate inquiry into a prison official’s state of mind,” . . . and it is 
no accident that the Court has repeatedly said that the Eighth 
Amendment has a “subjective component.”140 
Long before this articulation, the Supreme Court affirmed in Resweber 
that “[t]he fact that an unforeseeable accident prevented the prompt 
consummation of the sentence cannot, it seems to us, add an element of 
cruelty to a subsequent execution. There is no purpose to inflict 
unnecessary pain nor any unnecessary pain involved in the proposed 
execution.”141 Section 210.6 of the Model Penal Code, which in this regard 
is no different from other penal codifications in advanced common and 
civil law jurisdictions, also adopts an agent-subjective conception of 
cruelty when it stipulates that an especially cruel murder “manifesting 
exceptional depravity” aggravates the crime.142 
Both the agent-objective and agent-subjective conceptions of cruelty 
presuppose an understanding of legal order permanently vulnerable to 
violation, through both action and intention, by agents who have free will. 
In light of this presupposition, punishment is seen as the means to restore, 
through retributive or expressive means, the violated legal order, thus 
symbolically if not more concretely bringing it back to its ex ante 
authority. To punish, according to this view, is to establish, confirm, or 
 
 
 139. The first systematic articulation of this definition that I am aware of is found in Thomas 
Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae, published from 1265–1272, in particular Questions 2a2ae 157 and 159, 
dedicated to De Clementia et Mansuetudine and De Crudelitate, respectively, as part of his writings on 
the virtue of temperance. See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE Q. 157, 159 (Fathers of the 
English Dominican Province trans., 1947). 
 140. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 826 (as summarized in the reporter syllabus). 
 141. State of Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947). 
 142. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (1962) (§ 210.6 withdrawn by the American Law Institute in 
2009). 
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increase the authority of the challenged order,
143
 hence the insistence that 
the inflicted punishment not also violate, objectively or subjectively, the 
legal order it seeks to restore.  
A fundamental difference between objective and subjective agent-
based conceptions of cruelty emerges from the consideration of the mental 
elements involved. Objective conceptions are content with mere 
voluntariness of cruel behavior, which amounts simply to an absence of 
duress. The subjective conception, however, insists on some form of 
hedonistic relationship with suffering or, at the very least, criminal-like 
culpability. Hence, the resulting conception of cruelty is one in which, if 
not “sadism,”144 at least “deliberate indifference,”145 must be present.  
Furthermore, while agent-objectivism focuses on behavior and 
outcome, the agent-subjectivist understanding relaxes the outcome 
requirement in the context of punitive practices. In an anti-consequentialist 
move, agent-subjectivism comes close to dispensing altogether with the 
results of brutal action in the stipulation of the definitional core of cruel 
punishment. Correspondingly, this understanding does not require that 
deeds intended to mitigate suffering achieve palpable success either. In 
this case, righteous intention and sincere attempt are sufficient.  
Agent-subjectivism thus drives motivation
146
 to the core of the concept 
of cruel punishment, making it rest on that which motivates cruel and 
merciful behaviors. When applied to punitive power, mercy reveals 
unequivocal inclination toward the relief of suffering. In this context, 
mercy consists of a judgment of proportion and moderation. It is through 
the intermediation of a judgment of both proportion and moderation that 
society or the state may justly relieve suffering. Because proportion is a 
measure taken in light of law as a general parameter, relief of suffering is 
motivated, in the case of mercy, by a consideration alien to the passive 
experience of the agony of pain. Likewise, the relief of torment required 
by merciful motivations coexists with any intention on the part of the 
tormenter. That is why, when granting some respite from punishment, 
 
 
 143. Radicalized versions of this view are found in Kant’s and Hegel’s criminal law idealism.  
 144. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 313 (1986).  
 145. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991). “Deliberate indifference” is to be understood, the 
Court tells, as analogous to criminal recklessness. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. 
 146. Intent and motivation are, analytically speaking, distinguishable. Intention is the projection 
into the world of mentalist forces such as motivation. For example, I can say that motivated by A, I did 
B to C with the intention of undermining his enjoyment of D, where A may be something quite 
different from D, say a desire that C will give me money to stop doing B.  
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mercy does it from “a certain sweetness of disposition”147 that discourages 
infliction of pain on others.  
This perspective frames cruel punishment as the result of action 
inspired by an inadequate sense of proportion, disposition, or 
temperament. And with this, the mental disposition of the agent of cruelty 
is brought into the concept of cruelty. Whereas the agent-objective 
perspective considers divergence from a prescribed norm—a positive or 
natural norm, or a binding social or political norm thought to advance the 
public good—a necessary condition for cruelty in agent-subjectivism is a 
special state of mind of its agent. In the latter, it is in the intersection of the 
objective (what objectively occurs) with the subjective (what takes place 
in the conscience of the agent) that cruelty is determined. According to 
this conception, cruelty occurs only when suffering caused by excessive 
punishment is not prevented or mitigated because the agent intends or 
rejoices in the victim’s suffering.  
At least since the thirteenth century, the hope associated with the 
rejection of cruelty in punishment was that a rational decision to relieve 
suffering caused by punishment and a disposition of temper toward mercy 
would unite in the struggle to free humankind of this scourge.
148
 Modern 
criminal law has also been obsessed with human fault and redemption.
149
 
Inhuman inclinations such as cruelty are seen as ever-recurring reminders 
of humanity’s basest capacities. No matter how honorable in comparison 
to other creatures the human condition is, humanity’s membership in the 
animal kingdom condemns individual humans to experience, during their 
fragile and transitory existences, both purely animal and exclusively 
human inclinations. Most animal inclinations certainly fly under the radar 
of law. The conflicted condition of humankind renders each person 
susceptible to legal fault and reparation solely in relation to that much of 
their fault that is exclusively human, such as excess in punishing. The rest, 
according to this outlook, is fate.  
3. Victim-Subjective Cruelty 
What would the definition of cruelty look like from the perspective of 
its victims? From a perspective that relies comparatively less on objective 
 
 
 147. AQUINAS, supra note 139, Q. 157, Art. 3.  
 148. An important source of writing of the eleventh century was Anselm of Canterbury. See 
ANSELM OF CANTERBURY, THE MAJOR WORKS (Brian Davies & G.R. Evans eds., 2008). 
 149. For a history of criminal law doctrine in the United States, see Gerald Leonard, Towards a 
Legal History of American Criminal Theory: Culture and Doctrine from Blackstone to the Model 
Penal Code, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 691 (2003).  
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or subjective aspects of cruel agency and more on insight into what it must 
feel like to suffer cruelty, no matter the perpetrator? The United States 
Supreme Court has likewise failed to fully adopt this conception of 
cruelty. In Furman, the Court recognized that “[p]ain, certainly, may be a 
factor in the judgment. The infliction of an extremely severe punishment 
will often entail physical suffering.”150 The Furman Court went on to add, 
“the Framers also knew that there could be exercises of cruelty by laws 
other than those which inflicted bodily pain or mutilation. Even though 
there may be involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive torture, 
severe mental pain may be inherent in the infliction of a particular 
punishment.”151 In his dissent in Gregg v. Georgia (1976), Justice Brennan 
epitomized victim-subjectivism, writing that “[d]eath is . . . an unusually 
severe punishment, unusual in its pain, in its finality, and in its enormity 
. . . .”152 The victim-subjective conception of cruelty flips the semantic 
structure of the previous agency-oriented conceptions onto its head. Under 
this definition, cruel punitive agency is presupposed and the experience of 
the victim occupies the definitional center. This change means, first, that 
the perspective from which to understand cruelty is that of the suffering 
subject and, second, that the crudeness of moral sensibility may count 
more than reason in circumstances of reasonable disagreement about 
jurisprudential questions of meaning or metaphysical questions about 
desert or affliction.
153
  
Thus, the victim-subjective conception of cruelty developed alongside 
a non-metaphysical conception of law and politics, parallel to a 
contextualizing and demystifying conception of authority, and on the basis 
of intuitionist or naturalist moral theory.
154
 When there is nothing else to 
 
 
 150. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 271 (1976) (citation omitted). 
 151. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 152. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 230 (1976). 
 153. The moral and legal thought of Michel de Montaigne is the first modern source to articulate 
the victim’s perspective on the definition and evaluation of cruelty. See MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE, On 
Cruelty, in THE COMPLETE ESSAYS 472-488 (M.A. Screech ed. & trans., 2003). Montaigne, we should 
not forget, is a self-proclaimed champion of contradictions, if thought is to better reflect life as it is. An 
analysis of Montaigne’s ideas on law, customs, natural and social orders etc., would be helpful to 
understand the emergence, in modern times, of the experiential conception of cruelty. This analysis, 
unfortunately, cannot be accommodated within the bounds of this Article. 
 154. See, as another example of this epistemological outlook, the work of David Hume. The oft-
cited passage reads:  
But what have I here said, that reflections very refin’d and metaphysical have little or no 
influence upon us? This opinion I can scarce forbear retracting, and condemning from my 
present feeling and experience. The intense view of these manifold contradictions and 
imperfections in human reason has so wrought upon me, and heated my brain, that I am ready 
to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probable or 
likely than another. Where am I, or what? From what causes do I derive my existence, and to 
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law and customary norms than their contextual nature and the culture-
specificity of their claims to authority, focus should be directed to the 
differences that concretely matter and directly appeal to sensibilities. 
Concrete suffering, proponents of this perspective proclaim, provides such 
a focal point. 
This change nevertheless does take place in a broader cultural 
environment. In writing about the origins and nature of our civilization, 
Freud sought to “represent the sense of guilt as the most important 
problem” in its development.155 The price to be paid for civilization should 
also be clear, “for our advance in civilization is a loss of happiness 
through the heightening of the sense of guilt.”156 It is, to a large measure, 
the cultivation of a sense of guilt and a softer and more expressionist 
approach to the morals of punishment, rather than a rationalistic approach, 
that characterize the victim-subjective perspective. Consequently, the 
experiential definition of cruelty avoids arid doctrinal disputes about 
norms, conscience, desert, free will, motivation, and intention. What 
matters, in definitional terms, is the great suffering caused by punishment.  
Proponents of this perspective argue that “[n]o action can be properly 
called virtuous, which is not accompanied with the sentiment of self-
approbation.”157 It is therefore this very sentiment of self-approbation or, 
once that sense is lacking, guilt, that curbs any inclination toward cruelty 
and through which cruelty would be found to be incompatible with 
civilized punishment. Even if, from a cognitive point of view, normative 
universalism seems impossible, it is still not a priori impossible for us to 
 
 
what condition shall I return? Whose favour shall I court, and whose anger must I dread? 
What beings surround me? And on whom have I any influence, or who have any influence on 
me? I am confounded with all these questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most 
deplorable condition imaginable, inviron’d with the deepest darkness, and utterly depriv’d of 
the use of every member and faculty. 
Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature 
herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium, 
either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some avocation, and lively impression of my 
senses, which obliterate all these chimeras. I dine, I play a game of back-gammon, I converse, 
and am merry with my friends; and when after three or four hour’s amusement, I wou’d 
return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strain’d, and ridiculous, that I cannot 
find in my heart to enter into them any farther.  
Here then I find myself absolutely and necessarily determin’d to live, and talk, and act like 
other people in the common affairs of life. 
DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 268–69 (P.H. Nidditch ed., 2d ed. 1978) (1739–1740). 
 155. SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 97 (James Strachey ed. & trans., 
1989). 
 156. Id. 
 157. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 178 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., 
1982). 
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have the empathetic experience of fellow-feeling for others. It is in the 
capacity to understand the feelings of other persons, not in the 
impossibility of understanding and internalizing their worldviews, that 
inspiration and justification are found for mitigating the horrors of 
punitive cruelty.  
The appeal of the victim-subjective conception of cruelty is made 
directly to the audience of ordinary people who, in their mundane 
existences, live between the extremes of the rational control of their brutal 
inclinations and the “affable nature” of a personality “which of itself finds 
indulgence and vice distasteful . . . .”158 According to this approach to 
cruelty, punitive virtue is often earned in a battle with the self. Punitive 
decency finds its foundation in the victory of the gentle over the brutal 
self.  
Victim subjectivism displays, in equal doses, epistemological frugality 
and moral pessimism. Indeed, victim subjectivism often finds it safer to 
rely on sensibility than on reason, and is ready to settle for imperfect 
systems of government as far as they guarantee equal protection from the 
cruelty and other inhumanities people have learned to fear most. This same 
type of moral pessimism is, of course, found in the liberal tradition of legal 
and political thought.
159
  
Compassion
160
 is the major inspiration for the revolt against cruelty. It 
is the image of intense suffering that triggers in the mind of the observer 
an idea of what the pain and suffering of another being must be like. This 
representational task is, by definition, that of compassion: to make it 
possible to import into one’s mind the feelings of others. And once this 
enlargement of one’s sensory universe incorporates pain and terror, one is 
bound to see the world from the perspective of suffering. Victim-
subjectivists seem to believe that this sensibility is teachable.
161
 
 
 
 158. MONTAIGNE, supra note 153, at 476–77. 
 159. See JUDITH N. SHKLAR, The Liberalism of Fear, reprinted in POLITICAL THOUGHT AND 
POLITICAL THINKERS 3–20 (Stanley Hoffmann ed., 1998).  
 160. The centrality of compassion to modern legal, political, and moral thought cannot be 
overestimated. It suffices to point out how important compassion was for Montaigne, Rousseau, Adam 
Smith, and Hume. 
 161. “My advice would be that exemplary severity intended to keep the populace to their duty 
would be practiced not on criminals but on their corpses.” MONTAIGNE, supra note 154, at 483. See, 
e.g., JUDITH N. SHKLAR, ORDINARY VICES (1984); RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND 
SOLIDARITY (1989) (inspired by Shklar’s connection between a victim-subjective conception of 
cruelty and a particular tradition of liberal thought); John Kekes, Cruelty and Liberalism, 106 ETHICS 
834 (1996) (resists, in the name of conservatism, the liberal claim to monopoly over concerns with 
cruelty). 
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The victim-subjectivist conception of cruelty thus tends to be less 
technical than those formed by its counterparts examined above. What it 
does is put forward a necessary, if insufficient, element of the definition of 
cruelty: the victim’s suffering. It is in the act of causing suffering, in the 
actual victimization, at the time it happens, that cruelty takes place. There 
is no cruelty, no matter how disproportionate a course of action or how 
nefarious its intent, unless suffering is present. This conception of cruelty 
is, of course, as dependent upon agency as the agent-dependent 
conceptions were on presupposing a suffering victim. What matters for 
their analytical distinction is the foregrounding and backgrounding 
choices—semantic and normative—that place either the victim of cruelty 
(in his suffering) or the agent of cruelty (in his behavior or state of mind) 
at the center of the notion of cruelty. In victim-subjectivism, all allusions 
to acts or states of mind are subjected to the controlling criterion of 
suffering.  
Whereas suffering is a non-definitional factual premise for agent-based 
definitions of cruelty, on the victim-based definition it is pain that imbues 
the acts and omissions implicated in causing it with their ultimate cruel 
nature.
162
 Were it not for the screams and groans of a suffering being, there 
would be no cruelty, despite any conceivable hedonistic gratification on 
the part of the agent of torture or other forms of brutality. Without the 
victim’s extreme suffering, the same acts blamable under agent-based 
conceptions of cruelty transubstantiate into innocent acts under victim 
subjectivism.
163
 In the victim-subjective conception of cruelty, the state of 
mind of agents of cruelty adds only a qualification to cruelty, a degree, as 
it were, of culpability. 
The punitive outlook emerging from victim-subjectivism is clear: the 
types, amount, and methods of punishment are to be humane and show 
structural compassion. The political impact of this conception of cruelty 
and the accompanying urge to educate sensibilities to cruelty are immense. 
Because compassion could conceivably reach degrees of moral 
generalization that the idiosyncrasies of individual mental faculties would 
probably not allow on a cognitive basis, compassion becomes the 
instrument par excellence of punitive moderation. If knowledge cannot be 
 
 
 162. “If I had not seen it,” says Montaigne, “I could hardly have made myself believe that you 
could find souls so monstrous that they would commit murder for the sheer fun of it . . . .” 
MONTAIGNE, supra note 154, at 484. However, it is in the “the pitiful gestures and twitchings of a man 
dying in agony, while hearing his screams and groans” that one finds “the farthest point that cruelty 
can reach . . . .” Id.  
 163. “My advice would be that exemplary severity intended to keep the populace to their duty 
would be practised not on criminals but on their corpses . . . .” Id. at 483. 
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relied upon for the betterment of society, compassion can. Once the 
perspective of the suffering subject of cruelty is brought into the normative 
imagination, a whole new normative territory is open for liberal 
democratic constitutionalism.  
4. Agent-Independent, Victim-Objective Cruelty 
The conceptions of cruelty discussed above are reductionist in 
important ways. They can solely capture the cruelty that takes place within 
the confines of the binomial agency/pain, where cruelty obtains only when 
a certain pain threshold is reached as result of certain types of conduct 
accompanied by relevant mentalist elements (|agency/pain| = cruelty). The 
agent-independent, victim-objective conception changes this binomial. 
The causation/indignity pair is substituted for agency/pain, and now 
cruelty is the case when a grave violation of human dignity, which in 
normal circumstances would reach the pain threshold for cruelty, is caused 
by an agent or impersonal institutions, structures, or contexts (|human 
cause/indignity| = cruelty).
164
 
Constitutional jurisprudence in most liberal democratic jurisdictions 
has considered and by and large rejected agent-independent causation in 
the definition of cruelty. In Wilson, the United States Supreme Court 
stipulated that:  
Petitioner, and the United States as amicus curiae in support of 
petitioner, suggests that we should draw a distinction between 
“short-term” or “one-time” conditions (in which a state of mind 
requirement would apply) and “continuing” or “systemic” 
conditions (where official state of mind would be irrelevant). We 
perceive neither a logical nor a practical basis for that distinction. 
The source of the intent requirement is not the predilections of this 
Court, but the Eighth Amendment itself, which bans only cruel and 
unusual punishment. If the pain inflicted is not formally meted out 
as punishment by the statute or the sentencing judge, some mental 
 
 
 164. One interesting parallel can be drawn between this definition of cruelty and the definition of 
torture in the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture. Article 2 reads: “Torture shall 
also be understood to be the use of methods upon a person intended to obliterate the personality of the 
victim or to diminish his physical or mental capacities, even if they do not cause physical pain or 
mental anguish.” Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture art. 2, Dec. 9, 1985, 
O.A.S.T.S. No. 67. 
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element must be attributed to the inflicting officer before it can 
qualify.
165
  
This rejection was, however, under-predicted by the jurisprudence of the 
Court. In Furman, one finds the acknowledgement that systemic 
subjection of minorities vitiates any penal system that unequally allocates 
punitive burdens against such minorities.
166
 Justice Marshall said it better:  
[T]he burden of capital punishment falls upon the poor, the 
ignorant, and the underprivileged members of society. . . . Their 
impotence leaves them victims of a sanction that the wealthier, 
better-represented, just-as-guilty person can escape. So long as the 
capital sanction is used only against the forlorn, easily forgotten 
members of society, legislators are content to maintain the status 
quo, because change would draw attention to the problem and 
concern might develop. Ignorance is perpetuated and apathy soon 
becomes its mate, and we have today’s situation.167  
In an oft-cited passage, the Supreme Court has considered the human 
dignity aspect of cruelty. Justice Brennan’s opinion in Furman contains 
the most extensive and deepest effort to date to reflect on the nature of 
cruel punishment in the context of American constitutionalism. The 
opinion sought to articulate the four principles under which violations of 
the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments 
were to be determined. The principles, of which the first is most important, 
were the following: (i) “a punishment must not be so severe as to be 
degrading to the dignity of human beings”; (ii) “that the [s]tate must not 
arbitrarily inflict a severe punishment” (iii); that the “severe punishment 
must not be unacceptable to contemporary society”; and, finally, (iv) “that 
a severe punishment must not be excessive. A punishment is excessive 
under this principle if it is unnecessary . . . .”168  
 
 
 165. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991). 
 166. In his concurrence, Justice Douglas wrote: 
The words “cruel and unusual” certainly include penalties that are barbaric. But the words, at 
least when read in light of the English proscription against selective and irregular use of 
penalties, suggest that it is “cruel and unusual” to apply the death penalty—or any other 
penalty—selectively to minorities whose numbers are few, who are outcasts of society, and 
who are unpopular, but whom society is willing to see suffer though it would not countenance 
general application of the same penalty across the board. 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 244-45 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 167. Id. at 365–66 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 168. Id. at 271, 274, 277, 279 (Brennan, J., concurring).  
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But how realistic would it be to expect extant constitutional doctrine to 
adopt the principle that respect for the person as free and equal 
embodiment of human dignity ought to be proactively affirmed through, 
rather than simply not violated by, punishment? Fairly realistic, actually. 
In Furman, the United States Supreme Court affirmed that dignity is the 
value underlying the Eighth Amendment. In another important passage, 
the Court explained that:  
The barbaric punishments condemned by history, punishments 
which inflict torture, such as the rack, the thumbscrew, the iron 
boot, the stretching of limbs and the like, are, of course, attended 
with acute pain and suffering. When we consider why they have 
been condemned, however, we realize that the pain involved is not 
the only reason. The true significance of these punishments is that 
they treat members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to 
be toyed with and discarded. They are thus inconsistent with the 
fundamental premise of the Clause that even the vilest criminal 
remains a human being possessed of common human dignity.
169
  
But well before Furman, the Court had already stated that “the basic 
concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity 
of man.”170  
More recently, the human dignity aspect of cruelty would find echo in 
Justice Blackmun’s concurrence in Farmer.171 However, doctrine must be 
reconstructed to make it consistent with the principles that state violence 
in the form of punishment ought to be conceived and practiced as cruelty-
free and that respect for the person as a free and equal embodiment of 
human dignity ought to be proactively affirmed through, rather than 
simply not violated by, punishment. One step in this reconstruction is 
precisely the articulation of a conception of cruelty that includes but also 
reaches beyond the confines of the agency-pain relationship, beyond active 
agency and its motivations, and beyond the actual and conscious suffering 
 
 
 169. Id. at 272–73 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 170. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100. Justices Cardozo’s and Frankfurter’s substantive due 
process jurisprudences are equally rich in the consideration of human dignity as a fundamental 
constitutional value. That in recent years the Court and commentators have made much of a contrast 
between libertarian and dignitarian constitutions, classifying the U.S. Constitution among the former is 
therefore ahistorical.  
 171. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 851–58 (Blackmun, J., concurring). An antecedent can be 
found in the arresting language of Justice Murphy’s dissent in In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 26 (1946) 
(Murphy, J., dissenting). 
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of its victims. How would such a conception impact our understanding of 
cruelty in the context of punishment?  
If law is not pure logic,
 
it is certainly not pure cost-benefit pragmatism 
either.
172
 Discoveries in the social sciences and psychology as well as 
insight into the requirements of justice have shaped criminal law. For 
example, one of the important lessons taught by the sciences and reflection 
on the nature and requirements of justice is that to fully grasp cruelty in 
the world, discrete agency and conscious suffering are not necessary 
definitional criteria. A conception of cruelty must sometimes transcend 
discrete agency and conscious suffering in order to be responsive to the 
moral capacity to reject cruelty.  
On the victim-objective, agent-independent conception, agency is 
complemented, if not altogether replaced, by impersonal causation, and the 
concern with suffering is expressed as a principled commitment to 
inherent human dignity, even where sentience is not fully present. The 
moral and legal significance of vulnerability is also important to this 
conception of cruelty, which requires integration of the preoccupation with 
punitive agency and intention and the stipulation of the structural aspects 
of justice and vulnerability. It also asks for the sublimation of concern 
with suffering into the stipulation of what dignity demands.
173
  
It is, I would claim, the proper exercise of legal reasoning that calls 
forth the fourth conception of cruelty. If you start out from the acceptance 
of legal reasons for constraining power’s brutality and suffering-causing 
tendencies, and think hard enough about them—avoiding inconsistencies, 
following normative entailments, spelling out practical requirements, and 
seeking universalizability
174—you will at some point in the development 
of a comprehensive theory of cruelty find the necessity of complementing 
agent-based and victim-subjectivist conceptions with a victim-objective, 
agent-independent view. In other words, once pain-causing agency is set 
under legal scrutiny and a concern with suffering is given legal and moral 
priority, consistent reasoning should force consideration of structural 
causation and suffering-independent justifications for caring for others. As 
far as the law is concerned, this push is best understood as part of the 
 
 
 172. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881). 
 173. Germany is still the leading jurisdiction in developing and enforcing a legal conception of 
human dignity. Article 1 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany reads “[h]uman 
dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.” 
GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl I 
(Ger.).  
 174. Universalizability in the Kantian sense, meaning the potential shown by select normative 
formulations to achieve universal validity. More below on moral universalization and criminal law.. 
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operation of practical legal reasoning that, through forces internal to itself, 
leads to dissatisfaction with principles that are not pushed to their logical 
conclusions.
175
 This is not a light proposition, I realize, but not all true 
propositions are uncontroversial.  
Nevertheless, once more is said about it, I expect the reader will 
recognize in her or his own views and in prevalent legal and moral 
institutions the marks of the victim-objective, agent-independent 
conception of cruelty. The reason for this prevalence is in part historical. 
The evolution of the understanding of cruelty is not an unfamiliar story. 
As modern Western societies moved from the naturalization of poverty,
176
 
rigid social hierarchy, and brutality towards the conception of misery as 
human-made, to the equality of all as being legally and morally required, 
and to a more subtle and encompassing understanding of human suffering, 
legal systems came to increasingly display the marks of these shifts.
177
 The 
 
 
 175. An earlier articulation of the type of practical reason relevant here is found in Kant, who 
postulated the existence of a “dialectic of reflection,” founded on the recognition that “it is an essential 
principle of every use of our reason to push its cognition to consciousness of its necessity . . . .” 
IMMANUEL KANT, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 108 (Mary 
J. Gregor ed. & trans., 1996) [hereinafter KANT, Groundwork]. 
 176. The American colonial and post-colonial economic experiences were central to this 
movement. See generally HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION (1963). 
 177. A phenomenon taking place at the crossroads of consciousness and experience, the intricacies 
of these changes beg explanation. Nonetheless, this cannot be provided here. See Barrozo, 
Jurisprudence of Cruelty, supra note 15, where I argue that the classical sociological explanations of 
the development of modern criminal law are insufficient to account for the nature and direction of its 
development. These explanations include attribution of causal weight to: processes of instrumental and 
intra-systemic rationalization; macro-shifts in the forms of collective consciousness; political 
strategizing of empowered elites in the face of distributive pressures exerted by an electoral populace 
under conditions of democracy or revolutionary threat; changes in the nature and capillarity of power; 
occasional crystallization of opinion into social movements, institutions, and so on, thus defeating their 
competitors in the open market of ideas; and changing conceptions of law on the part of jurists. Even 
when not totally directionless, these factors are at least highly underdetermining of structure and 
content. In The Jurisprudence of Cruelty in Criminal Law, I complement and rectify these classical 
explanatory models proposed by MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Guenther Roth & Claus 
Wittich eds., Univ of Calif. Press 1978). Weber is quite aware, though, that without consideration of 
material and ideal interests, rationalization is a highly undertermining process. An early statement of 
this awareness is found in MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 38 
(Routledge 2001) (1904), where Weber writes “one may . . . rationalize life from fundamentally 
different basic points of view and in very different directions. Rationalism,” he adds, “is an historical 
concept which covers a whole world of different things.” See also EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF 
LABOR IN SOCIETY (W.D. Halls trans., The Free Press 1997) (1893); KARL MARX, Manifesto of the 
Communist Party, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 469–500 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 1978); KARL 
MARX, Critique of the Gotha Program, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 525–41 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 
1978); KARL MARX, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 
594-617 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 1978) (and the suspicion against the welfare state in neo- and post-
Marxist thought); MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan 
Sheridan trans., 1979); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS (John Gray ed., Oxford 
Univ. Press 1998); ALAN WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF LAW (1985). 
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emerging legal structure of the fourth conception of cruelty has three 
pillars that reflect this historical development. These pillars are inherent 
human dignity, negative structure, and positive structure.  
Consider first the idea of inherent dignity.
178
 As modern criminal and 
constitutional law advanced, concern with suffering developed in two 
directions. First, it expanded to encompass not only human life but all 
sentient life.
179
 In the second direction of development, the initial concern 
with suffering has also advanced to encompass non-sentient, unaware, or 
unconscious human beings.
180
 To contemporary observers, this latter 
development appears interlaced with secularized philosophies proclaiming 
that human life has inviolable status and overriding moral and legal 
preeminence.
181
  
 
 
 178. The idea has both natural law, Kantian, and, maybe surprisingly, utilitarian roots. The first 
two are more familiar origins. The latter can be seen in the way utilitarian thought came under the 
influence of the idea of human dignity. J.S. Mill modified the idea of happiness to include the 
entailments of a “sense of dignity” each person naturally possessed. According to Mill, the utilitarian 
calculation needs to factor in individual dignity in the evaluations of the collective state of affairs. In 
this respect, the oft-cited passage—the “Socrates passage”—is in MILL, supra note 178, at 140. For the 
intellectual history of the idea, see MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY: ITS HISTORY AND MEANING (2012). 
For a learned and transjurisdictional analysis of the legal meanings and applications of the concept, see 
Luís Roberto Barroso, Here, There, and Everywhere: Human Dignity in Contemporary Law and in the 
Transnational Discourse, 35 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 331 (2012). 
 179. Under the pressure of the accusation of speciesism, it has been proposed that the value of life 
be extended to all sentient life. See generally PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION (HarperCollins 
2002) (1975). Of course, the concern with cruelty is not restricted to law and morality, either. My soap 
bar label reads: “Chamomile: cruelty-free, biodegradable, natural, no artificial colors.” 
 180. Examples would include crimes against the dead, regulation of terminal care, euthanasia, 
abortion, etc. Law’s concern with the non-sentient is a double-edged sword, though. It is worthwhile to 
note that both in its protective and punitive modes, the law shows interest in the human person not 
only beyond one’s sentient self, but also after one’s life has ended. For an excellent, and, to my 
knowledge, the first, systematic study of various ways in which contemporary law reacts to the 
inevitability of human finitude, see RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING 
POWER OF THE AMERICAN DEAD (2010). Madoff offers “super capital punishment” as an example of 
criminal law reaching beyond life in order to punish the deceased. She explains:  
A critical, though largely forgotten, issue involving the historical treatment of dead bodies 
was the practice of desecrating the body as punishment for particularly egregious crimes. An 
early example of the phenomenon occurred on 30 January 1661. On that day the bodies of the 
regicides Oliver Cromwell, Henry Ireton, and John Bradshaw were exhumed, dragged to 
London’s place of execution, Tyburn, on hurdles, and hanged before a crowd of thousands. At 
sunset, the bodies were taken down, decapitated, and buried in a pit under Tyburn, while the 
heads were placed on spikes atop Westminster Hall. Dismemberment of the body was 
understood by many as a way of punishing the traitor beyond the grave.  
Id. at 21. 
 181. Here is the archetypical formulation of this idea in the Kantian corpus: 
Rational nature is distinguished from the rest of nature by this, that it sets itself an end. This 
end would be the matter of every good will. But since, in the idea of an absolutely good will 
without any limiting condition (attainment of this or that end), abstraction must be made 
altogether from every end to be effected (this would make every will only relatively good), 
the end here must be thought of not as an end to be effected but as an independently existing 
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While judgments and opinions influenced by experience—whether as 
custom, tradition, or partisan politics—suffer from the exaggerated 
influence of the transitory forces of under-reflective experience, legal 
reasoning, when successful, can reach and articulate principles capable of 
standing with relative independence vis-à-vis those influences and yet 
receive the seal of legal authority. It was from the relative independence 
from experience and the possibility of legal authority through reason that 
the idea of inherent dignity and its derivative duties first gained the 
momentum that led to its codification in virtually every place where 
democracy and liberalism combined.
182
 But why should we care when 
suffering on the part of the subject is not present? What is the basis for 
caring for the unconscious or unaware in the way we often do?  
The argument is that inherent dignity values not so much any specific 
individual as the humanity in each of them. The insight here is not that 
humanity instrumentally needs individuals in order to more completely 
manifest the whole spectrum of attributes and capacities of the species. 
More important to the law is the understanding that human membership is 
both a necessary and sufficient condition of entitlement, despite any 
idiosyncrasy or individual characteristic, to the equal unconditional status 
of a dignified being. Once touched by humanity, each individual is granted 
special dignity. This outlook clearly transcends initial concerns with actual 
suffering in the first three conceptions of cruelty. From within it, observers 
are able to see and reject cruelty even where suffering is absent.  
 
 
end, and hence thought only negatively, that is, as that which must never be acted against and 
which must therefore in every volition be estimated never merely as a means but always at the 
same time as an end. Now, this end can be nothing other than the subject of all possible ends 
itself, because this subject is also the subject of a possible absolutely good will; for, such a 
will cannot without contradiction be subordinated to any other object. The principle, so act 
with reference to every rational being (yourself and others) that in your maxim it holds at the 
same time as an end in itself, is thus at bottom the same as the basic principle, act on a maxim 
that at the same time contains in itself its own universal validity for every rational being. For, 
to say that in the use of means to any end I am to limit my maxim to the condition of its 
universal validity as a law for every subject is tantamount to saying that the subject of ends, 
that is, the rational being itself, must be made the basis of all maxims of actions, never merely 
as a means but as the supreme limiting condition in the use of all means, that is, always at the 
same time as an end. 
KANT, Groundwork, supra note 176, at 86–87 (emphasis omitted). 
 182. Sometimes, though, the word cruelty is omitted. Article 3 (Prohibition of Torture) of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms does not 
mention the word cruelty, reading instead “no one shall be subject to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.” European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. For a study of Article 3, see JOHN 
COOPER, CRUELTY: AN ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE 3 (2003). 
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The perspective from human dignity has also enabled criticism of 
courses of action, individual or collective predicaments, and states of 
affairs even when confronted with the complacency, unawareness, or 
indifference of those subjected to them. In fact, this kind of putative 
representation of the victimized other has become common practice not 
only in the courts of law, but also in constitutional politics and social 
movements everywhere. Absent the ability to articulate the normative 
basis for claims made on behalf of those persons unable or unwilling to 
make such claims themselves, law, society, and politics would look very 
different from how they do today.  
But human dignity is only half of the story of the fourth conception of 
cruelty. The other half refers to the structural causes of (and favoring 
conditions for) cruelty. Structural causes or conditions can be said to be 
positive or negative. Negative structures function by restricting 
opportunities to escape cruelty or by maintaining in place favorable, 
though not often independently causally sufficient, conditions for cruelty. 
Given a certain alignment of negative structures, even well-intended acts 
of love can be proximate causes of cruelty. Positive structures, on the 
other hand, actively set in place and facilitate causes of cruelty or 
otherwise forge types of relationships in which cruelty thrives. Given a 
certain alignment of positive structures, even heroic acts of deliverance 
will not be enough to save victims from cruelty. If you wanted to point to 
one institution that embodies both the negative and positive structural 
conditions of cruelty, you could point to the American prison system.  
To acknowledge the causal relevance of negative structures is to 
concede that institutions never come to social life at a perfectly isonomic 
starting point for their members. When they emerge, institutions tend to 
crystallize existing social arrangements and distributive patterns, a 
crystallization that seldom survives critique leveled from the perspective 
of justice.
183
 The ensuing responsibility for legal analysis is clear. Such 
analysis must interrogate the subtleties of the interaction between existing 
institutions and the prevalence of rights violations, an interaction that the 
 
 
 183. Mill writes:  
Laws and systems of polity always begin by recognizing the relations they find already 
existing between individuals. They convert what was a mere physical fact into a legal right, 
give it the sanction of society, and principally aim at the substitution of public and organized 
means of asserting and protecting these rights, instead of the irregular and lawless conflict of 
physical strength. Those who had already been compelled to obedience became in this 
manner legally bound to it. 
JOHN STUART MILL, The Subjection of Women, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 475 (John Gray 
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998). 
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social sciences have shown to be constantly hidden behind the opacity of 
the mechanisms of social cohesion, behavioral patterns, and common 
opinion.  
Speaking to the predicament of women in Victorian society, J.S. Mill, 
the great modern critic of negative structures, pointed to the way in which 
social structure negatively influenced their opportunities to escape 
suffering, rendering them, on the contrary, considerably more vulnerable 
to cruelty and exploitation.
184
 “[S]ex is to all women,” Mill wrote, 
“peremptory exclusion . . . .”185 It was a form of exclusion that, because of 
the largely stealth and negative operation of its structural components, 
remained widely unarticulated, if not completely hidden.
186
 Invisible, its 
victims were thus condemned to “the feeling of a wasted life” and 
suffering without much, if any, sympathy from the rest of society.
187
 The 
point here is the development of an awareness of structures that 
functionally render specific categories of individuals particularly 
vulnerable. In the predicament of the most vulnerable everywhere, the 
institutional apparatus of negative structure accrues barriers to collective 
acts of resistance. This result is caused by either the dispersion of the 
directly affected, or the immediacy and proximity of the impact of 
negative structures. Once again, just think of American prisons. 
With the practical and institutional mechanisms of negative structure 
come its ideological components, the influence of which appears to 
naturalize or otherwise legitimize their potential for cruelty. Who has not 
heard in response to the criticism of prisons as hotbeds of cruelty that 
everyone there chose that fate, and that bad things are part of incarceration 
anyway? Justice Thomas wrote in his concurrence in Farmer: “Prisons are 
necessarily dangerous places; they house society’s most antisocial and 
violent people in close proximity with one another. Regrettably, ‘some 
level of brutality and sexual aggression among [prisoners] is 
inevitable . . . .’”188 
As with the defense of the inherent-dignity part, the condemnation of 
negative structures is concerned with empowerment and protection of the 
individual. Legal analyses of negative structures, however, sometimes 
reveal their distinct impact on groups or categories of persons as well. 
When we examine the development of the Supreme Court’s equal 
 
 
 184. Id. at 581–82. 
 185. Id. at 581. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 858–59 (Thomas, J., concurring) (alteration in original). 
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protection jurisprudence, it is clear how much their inspiration and 
meaning reflect the critique of morally spurious negative structures as 
instruments of cruelty, suffering, humiliation, brutality, disempowerment, 
and vulnerability.  
Shifting attention to the problem of positive structures, the third pillar 
of agent-independent victim-objectivism, analyses of their impact show 
that diffuse agency through macro-institutional arrangements can actively 
and directly cause cruelty. The causal force of positive structure already 
figured prominently, if in a rustic and under-developed form, in Plato’s 
jurisprudence, as the initial exchanges in Laws illustrate.
189
 Only recently, 
however, has the preoccupation with the impact of positive structures 
acquired the status of a cause célèbre and a canonical theme of criminal 
and constitutional law.  
By now, it should be clear how reflection about negative structure and 
positive structure comes full circle with the value of inherent human 
dignity. The ideal of human dignity is made more palpable when 
awareness is encouraged of the impersonal factors that operate contrary to 
it. Today, it seems that only those prepared to pay a great intellectual price 
can be oblivious to the pervasiveness of negative and positive structures.  
5. Cruelty Redefined 
Cruelty often comes to its victim as an existential cataclysm. Justice 
Blackmun wrote in his concurrence in Farmer that cruel (rape, in that 
case) punishment “not only threatens the lives of those who fall prey to 
their aggressors, but is potentially devastating to the human spirit. Shame, 
depression, and a shattering loss of self-esteem accompany the perpetual 
terror the victim thereafter must endure.”190 He was, of course, correct. But 
it is not always that episodes of cruelty make so conspicuous an entrance 
onto the stage of human suffering. Because of that, one must beware of 
definitions of cruelty, such as the first three, that are unable to capture 
stealthy cruelty. Agent- (objective and subjective) and victim-based 
conceptions of cruelty turn out to be insufficiently capacious to 
accommodate the kinds of impersonal causation, lack of malign intentions, 
and even absence of the victim’s consciousness, that are involved in 
countless cruel inflictions in the context of punishment.  
The redefinition of cruelty I propose incorporates all subjective and 
objective criteria, although not as necessary conditions. However, unlike 
 
 
 189. See PLATO, LAWS (R.G. Bury trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1926).  
 190. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 853 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
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the agent-objective, agent-subjective, and victim-subjective conceptions, I 
propose to define cruelty solely on the basis of a causation-indignity 
binomial. This binomial captures all essential elements of cruelty while 
avoiding the under-inclusiveness of the first three conceptions. Thus 
defined, cruelty is the case whenever a grave violation of human dignity, 
that in normal circumstances would reach the suffering threshold for 
cruelty, is caused by an agent or impersonal institution, context, or 
structure (|human cause-indignity| = cruelty).  
Thus redefined, cruelty refers to severe violations of the respect, 
consideration, and care commanded by the dignity individuals embody. 
This is true whenever (although not solely when) those violations evoke 
the suffering threshold (severe harm) familiar to the agent- and victim-
based conceptions. In this preferred definition, cruelty is attributable not 
only to personified agency and identifiable intention, but also to the 
existence and operation of impersonal factors that shape the circumstances 
surrounding the victims of cruelty, leaving those victims relatively more 
vulnerable to violations of their dignity. These impersonal factors are 
identifiable in light of the cruelty they engender or facilitate, and not the 
other way around. This conception meets the demand that respect for the 
person as a free and equal embodiment of human dignity ought to be 
proactively affirmed through rather than simply not violated by 
punishment.  
C. Rights and Punishment: The Example of the Right Against Cruelty 
It is not uncommon for a fundamental constitutional right to be 
articulated as a rule shaped by a clash between two or more important 
constitutional principles. The right against cruel punishment presents just 
such a case. But unless the conception of right is properly understood, the 
reconstruction of constitutional punishment will remain shaky. In what 
follows, I offer a value theory of the right against cruel punishment and 
explain a few of the individually identifiable privileges, powers, actionable 
rights, and immunities that constitute this fundamental right.
 
 
1. Rights Redefined  
There is in liberal democratic constitutionalism a broad 
acknowledgement of the legal and moral authority of constitutional rights. 
This acknowledgement does not translate, however, into a universal 
consensus about the substance of those rights. Instead, questions about the 
substance of rights are contentious and more often than not pursued with 
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disappointing results. This outcome is unsurprising given the centrality of 
these rights to the manifold dimensions of the lives of right-holders,
191
 and 
considering the long list of duties, incapacitations, liabilities, and 
disabilities
192
 these rights impose on their states. This section contributes 
to the remediation of this situation.
193
 
The substance of fundamental rights depends upon two kinds of 
considerations.
194
 The first consideration is whether the right is better 
understood as protecting privileged will,
195
 interest,
196
 or value.
197
 The 
second consideration is what constitutional principles, if any, inform the 
constitutional norm upon which a fundamental right is founded. I discuss 
these questions in relation to the right emerging from the principles that 
state violence in the form of punishment ought to be conceived and 
practiced as cruelty-free and that respect for the person as free and equal 
embodiment of human dignity ought to be proactively affirmed through 
rather than simply not violated by punishment.  
Will theories of rights imply that constitutional rights protect privileged 
wills by reserving a legal sphere within which the individual will is 
absolute or semi-absolute.
198
 A classic example is the freedom of contract 
right expounded in Lochner v. New York (1905). In that case, the United 
States Supreme Court defined the liberty to form and enter into a contract 
as a right to the exclusion of all extraneous interferences with the will of 
the parties.
199
 This notion of rights was dominant in the nineteenth century, 
but has fallen out of favor. Its explanatory power in relation to the right 
 
 
 191. It has been correctly said that the rights of individuals evolved “from the protection of the 
sensibilities of their bodies to protection of the sensibilities of their souls.” EUGEN EHRLICH, 
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 362 (Walter L. Moll trans., 1936). The 
interesting parallel with the evolution of punishment is not to be forgotten here. For the changes in 
punishment, see FOUCAULT, supra note 178. 
 192. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). 
 193. This section draws from Paulo Barrozo, Finding Home in the World: A Deontological Theory 
of the Right to be Adopted, 55 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 701 (2011) [hereinafter Barrozo, Finding Home], 
where I first published my value conception of rights. I here modify and expand on that work in this 
regard. 
 194. Naturally, rights may be described in light of different sets of criteria. In this Article I 
approach the fundamental structure of rights via the nature of that which they protect at the core. For 
alternative approaches, see the following, in addition to other works cited in this section: Janneke 
Gerards & Hanneke Senden, The Structure of Fundamental Rights and the European Court of Human 
Rights, 7 INT’L J. CONST. L. 619 (2009).  
 195. See FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM OF THE MODERN ROMAN LAW (William 
Holloway trans., 1867). 
 196. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986). 
 197. See Barrozo, Finding Home, supra note 193. 
 198. See SAVIGNY, supra note 195. 
 199. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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against cruelty and to have one’s dignity affirmed even through 
punishment is nearly nil.  
The current prevalent conception of rights sees them as mechanisms to 
safeguard privileged individual interests over the interests of the state and 
third parties.
200
 In Lawrence v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court 
recognized the petitioner’s interest in engaging in intimate sexual conduct 
as privileged vis-à-vis Texas’ interest in regulating the matter.201 Similarly, 
when the Farmer Court stated that “[t]he Eighth Amendment places 
restraints on prison officials, who may not, for example, use excessive 
physical force against prisoners,”202 it extended protection to a prisoner’s 
interest in being free from excessive physical coercion. Likewise, when 
the same Court ruled that the Eighth Amendment “imposes duties” on 
prison officials to provide “humane conditions of confinement,” it 
effectively held that these duties are means to a prisoner’s interest in the 
necessities of life, such as food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and 
safety.
203
 
Under the interest conception, constitutional rights operate to allocate 
primacy to selected interests against competing ones. Despite the plasticity 
of the interest conception of rights to describe in its own terms the broad 
category of rights, it is unable to capture the dignitarian essence of rights 
in a reconstructed theory of constitutional punishment. As an alternative, I 
propose that rights be understood through the lens of protected values. 
The value theory of rights submits that a right protects individuals or 
groups as embodiments or agents of values, such as human dignity, 
liberty, or equality. Legal systems often allocate initiative to individuals or 
groups to protect the values they embody through justiciable claims. The 
result is a system of rights claims and enforcement mechanisms at least as 
decentralized as those systems afforded by the will and interest 
conceptions. However, unlike its contenders, the value theory of rights can 
adequately justify why, absent an individual’s ability or willingness to 
protect the value he embodies, authority or obligation to do so can be 
transferred to or jointly held by third parties. 
 
 
 200. See RAZ, supra note 196. 
 201. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 202. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (citing Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1 (1992)) 
(emphasis added). 
 203. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Compare the basic structure of a justiciable constitutional right as 
formulated by the three theories. 
(1) According to will and interest theories:  
Constitutional norm N gives A the right to make decisions on B 
without interference from I  
OR 
Constitutional norm N gives A the right to pursue interest B without 
interference from I. 
(2) According to the value theory: 
Constitutional norm N protects value B in A as against I, 
where the protection of value includes: 
Empowering A to promote B as against I  
AND 
Under certain conditions empowering others to protect B in A as 
against I. 
(3) In the example of punishment by confinement, the value 
conception of the rights not to be cruelly punished and to see the 
individual’s dignity affirmed though his punishment may be thus 
expressed:  
Constitutional norm N protects the human dignity of prisoners as 
against the state’s punitive power and authority, 
including by: 
(a) Primarily allocating to prisoners the power of legal initiative to 
claim this right in the course of promoting the human dignity they 
embody; 
(b) Creating an obligation for the state to guarantee the rights, 
privileges, powers, and immunities into which this right can be 
disaggregated; and 
(c) Creating the obligation for the state to remedy, by a 
combination of retrospective compensatory and prospective 
protective remedies, any violation of this right 
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WHERE 
(d) Punishment by confinement is defined as a retributive sanction 
(for a norm violation) that directly imposes a coerced vulnerability 
on the sanctioned party, including that which results in any 
significant deprivation and negative impact on the life of the 
confined; and 
(e) Cruelty in confinement is defined as a grave violation of human 
dignity that will, in normal circumstances, reach the suffering 
threshold for cruelty, whether it be caused by an agent, impersonal 
institution, or context. 
Constitutional rights norms usually stem from a value compromise. 
Fundamental values are complex entities and so are the constitutional 
norms that promote, protect, and reflect them. These constitutional norms 
are of varied nature. Some confer attributions, powers, and prerogatives on 
various governmental entities; others protect values through fundamental 
rights norms. A “complete constitutional right”204 expressed as a rule 
embodies at least one principle. Often, as I have noted, such a right 
incorporates two or more clashing principles. Inherent in the rights norm 
and principle(s) is a series of instrumental relational legal positions 
expressed as rights to do something, powers, and/or liberties.  
In constitutional orders, the principles of personal equality, freedom, 
and dignity, on one side, and social order, on the other, frequently collide. 
In the criminalization of conduct, the intensity of the collision between 
liberty and order is intensified.
205
 Constitutional rights in the context of 
punishment are therefore best understood and interpreted as a result of this 
collision. They encapsulate a central clause of any constitutional 
compromise: the state can take away personal liberty and create coerced 
vulnerability in order to punish violations of some of its most important 
laws, but in doing so it guarantees those being punished the protection 
against cruelty and the active promotion of their dignity.  
 
 
 204. See ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (2004).  
 205. That is the case even if you consider liberty to be liberty to pursue some morally justifiable 
ends and not any personally chosen end. See generally JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 
(1996). 
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2. Disaggregating the Right Against Cruelty 
I have argued that punishment coerces people into greater vulnerability, 
and that rights as tools to protect fundamental values embodied by 
individuals can be unbundled into different subcategories of entitlements 
and guarantees, each with its corresponding allocation of initiative, 
responsibility, and remedy. I have also shown that cruelty has objective 
and impersonal elements in addition to subjective and personal ones. I 
now detail the disaggregation of the constitutional right into which is 
translated the principle that state violence in the form of punishment ought 
to be conceived and practiced as cruelty-free.  
In the reconstructed paradigm for constitutional punishment advanced 
in this Article, once there is a finding of cruelty in the context of 
punishment, a non-exclusionary system of responsibilities attribution must 
follow. This system of responsibility includes strict liability for 
governmental entities (and their corporate proxies) and different degrees 
of responsibility for individuals (including judges, prison officials, and 
other inmates). As previously discussed, a “complete constitutional right” 
defines a multidimensional series of instrumental relational legal positions 
(vis-à-vis the values they promote) expressed as rights to something, 
powers, and/or liberties. 
Wesley Hohfeld helpfully identifies the following basic “jural” 
conceptions: right, no-right, privilege, duty, power, disability, immunity, 
and liability.
206
 These legal categories are then used by Hohfeld to create 
an analytical framework made operational by pairs of opposition and 
correlation.  
The opposite pairs are the following:  
Right or No-Right  
Privilege or Duty  
Power or Disability  
Immunity or Liability 
 
 
 206. See Hohfeld, supra note 193. 
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And these are the correlative pairs:  
Right v. Duty 
Privilege v. No-Right 
Power v. Liability 
Immunity v. Disability 
The logic of the analytics of opposition and correlation is simple but 
powerful.
207
 In legal relationships, such as those involving constitutional 
rights in the context of punishment, a party’s position vis-à-vis some other 
party falls under at least one of these categories: right or no-right, privilege 
or duty, power or disability, and immunity or liability. The object of these 
legal relationships can be, for example, for one of the parties to be kept 
away from a general male prison population if she is a male-to-female 
transgendered person. Thus, if party P has a right vis-à-vis party P’ in 
relation to a specific legal object O, party P cannot have a simultaneous 
No-Right vis-à-vis party P’ in relation to the same object O. This proviso 
is equally valid for all the other pairs.  
Things become even more interesting when we get to correlative pairs. 
In reality, opposite legal categories never confront each other, for where 
one opposite is present, the other, by definition, cannot be. The 
confrontation is with correlatives. Hence, if a party P has a Right in 
relation to a specific legal object O, it necessarily follows that there is a 
party P’ out there with a corresponding Duty in relation to the same legal 
object. If P has a Privilege in relation to O, P’ can claim No-Right in 
relation to it; if P has a Power in relation to O, P’ is Liable to endure the 
exercise by P of her Power; and if P has an Immunity in relation O, P’ is 
Disabled from exercising any claims or interests in relation to O vis-à-vis 
P. And so on. 
 
 
 207. For those impatient with all this analytical paraphernalia, let me quote Hohfeld: 
If, therefore, the title of this article suggests a merely philosophical inquiry as to the nature of 
law and legal relations—a discussion regarded as more or less as an end in itself—the writer 
may be pardoned for repudiating such a connotation in advance. On the contrary, . . . the main 
purpose of the writer is to emphasize certain oft-neglected matters that may aid in the 
understanding and in the solution of practical, every-day problems of the law. 
Id. at 20. There is an undeniable Aristotelian logic of identity and difference in Hohfeld’s analytics. In 
opposition, the conceptualism in the European thought of the nineteenth century was inspired by the 
gymnastics of working pure the basic legal concepts inherited from the Romans through the hands of 
the Justinian codification, although this discussion is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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In complex legal relations such as those governed by constitutional 
rights, the right-holder occupies the center of a field of correlative 
dimensions of the right, in potential opposition to any number of other 
legal agents. Prisoners are a case in point. A few examples will help 
illustrate how correlated pairs would work in the case of confinement.  
If prisoner P has a Right to be protected from other violent inmates, it 
necessarily follows that the state has a corresponding Duty to keep her 
protected at all times during confinement. If prisoner P has the Privilege to 
be released from prison at the end of her sentence, the state can claim No-
Right to keep her there longer. If prisoner P has the Power to undergo a 
gender reassignment, the state is Liable to endure this change. If prisoner 
P has an Immunity in relation to torture, the state is Disabled from 
torturing her.  
In another case, prisoner P has a Right (in a vertical relationship with 
the state) not to be a victim of cruelty for the duration of the punishment 
inflicted by the state, a punishment that is marked by coerced 
vulnerability. Additionally, prisoner P has other Rights, Privileges, 
Powers, and Immunities (horizontally) in relation to officials, contractors, 
other inmates, and so on, and (horizontally or vertically) vis-à-vis the state 
in situations outside of the cruelty context. Suppose that while in custody, 
P is tortured, robbed, denied access to elections, bullied, humiliated, 
denied normal visits, placed in solitary confinement, starved, prevented 
from engaging in religious observance, suffers from mild food poisoning, 
has the papers containing his latest brilliant song lyrics taken from him, 
has his iPod accidentally damaged, is the victim of fraudulent loans, and 
breaks his fingers in a basketball game. How do we sort this all out? The 
correlational pairs help.  
This analysis merely gestures toward a remedies approach consistent 
with the principle that if any violation of the first principles of 
constitutional punishment occurs, that ought to be fully redressable, and 
adequate preventative remedies ought to be available and accessible to 
victims of the violation. While being punished, prisoners are in several 
simultaneous and consecutive legal relationships with the state-as-prison, 
individual prison officials, contractors, other inmates, and so on. Some of 
these relationships place inmates in Right, Privilege, Power, and Immunity 
positions. Violations of these positions pose the question of redress. 
Unless legally justifiable or excusable, these violations warrant 
remediation. What kind of remediation do they warrant? That will depend, 
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among other factors, on the nature of the position violated and the legal 
status of the violator.
208
 
Sorting out violations and corresponding remedies is a complex 
enterprise. Prisoner P is entitled to retrospective compensatory and 
punitive damages, prospective injunctive relief, and 
retrospective/prospective declaratory injunctions against the state for 
cruelty (for the torture included in the example above, certainly, and 
possibly for additional actions described, depending on the context) in 
violation of a constitutional right. On the other side of this legal relation, 
vis-à-vis the legal object “cruelty-free punishment,” stands the state in a 
correlational Duty. Such a Duty includes both a guarantee of cruelty-free 
punishment and a remedy for its objective performance failures. This Duty 
to remedy rights against cruelty violations is independent of other tort or 
contract-like damages prisoner P may be entitled to recover against 
officials, contractors, and other inmates.  
Prospective remedies pose a challenge to the legal system in most cases 
where they are used. One direction forward-looking remedies could take is 
complex litigation with managerial intervention by courts, as with school 
desegregation, redistricting, prison reform, etc. Additionally, and 
accompanying any symbolic value of declaratory judgments, one can 
imagine partial suspension or temporary limitation of punitive powers 
(generally, in relation to a category of offenses, or specifically, in relation 
to an individual prisoner) as a perfectly plausible injunctive relief.
209
  
 
 
 208. In the United States, the sovereign immunity of the federal states matters in the case of their 
prison facilities. As already noted above, in this Article I intentionally disregard state sovereign 
immunity problems. With Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Supreme Court, in order to 
vindicate both the supremacy clause and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
affirmed that violations by non-federal state actors of individual rights are also justiciable in federal 
court. However, in order to make it compatible with the interpretation of the state sovereign immunity 
clause of the Eleventh Amendment, two anomalous fictions were created. First, the Court stated that 
state agents acting unconstitutionally could not possibly be acting for or as the state, but solely in their 
private capacity. In their private capacity, state agents could be sued for offenses to constitutional 
individual rights. However, since the Bill of Rights creates a vertical system of rights, the rights 
recognized therein are attracted only where the state action requirement is met. The Court then 
considered that requirement met when the offender is a state actor. Nevertheless, since the first fiction 
has already established that in this case the state actor acts in her private capacity only, a second fiction 
had to be created to consider this acting as a private party as satisfying the state action requirement. 
This is, by and large, where we still are doctrinally in the United States.  
 209. Remember here that the Eighth Amendment rule strikes a proportion between the principle of 
freedom and the authority to punish in the name of social order.  
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In any event, whether facing harm caused by agents, structures, or a 
combination of both, correlative pairs help determine the appropriate 
remedial course:  
Right A → violation of duty created by A → responsibility → 
remedy 
Privilege B → nonexistent right (no-right) claimed/acted upon by 
non-right holder A as against B → responsibility → remedy 
Power C → liability resisted/denied → responsibility → remedy 
Immunity D → nonexistent power (disability) claimed/acted upon 
as against D → responsibility→ remedy 
In the legal universe, an offense made to a constitutional right is in a 
category of its own. Here, justice is called on not only to compensate for 
damages incurred by the victim, but also, and more significantly, to bring 
conditions, causes, and agents of violation back under the authority of the 
constitutional order. While tortious reparation remains a private matter, 
remediation of wrongdoing in breach of a constitutional right is a question 
central to the moral character of polities. Reconstructed constitutional 
punishment makes violations of rights in the context of punishment fully 
redressable and makes adequate preventative remedies available and 
accessible to all.  
3. Further Implications for Remedies and Judicial Policymaking 
This Article articulated four conceptions of cruelty according to the 
types of agency, causality, and victimization involved. All four types 
plague punishment, and it would be unwarranted to expect that one type of 
remediation would efficiently prevent and fairly redress all of them. I have 
also argued for a value conception of fundamental rights. According to 
this conception, reconstructed constitutional punishment not only protects 
the human dignity of prisoners against the state’s punitive power and 
authority; it must actively promote that dignity through punishment. It 
does so, first, by primarily allocating to individuals being punished the 
legal initiative to claim rights in the course of promoting the human 
dignity those individuals embody. Second, a value theory of constitutional 
rights in the context of punishment interprets such rights as creating an 
obligation for the state to guarantee the rights, privileges, powers, and 
immunities into which those rights disaggregate. Finally, a value theory of 
rights creates an obligation for states to remedy rights violations by a 
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combination of retrospective compensatory and prospective protective 
remedies.  
Furthermore, I have suggested a way to disaggregate the Eighth 
Amendment right. The logic of disaggregation obeyed the general 
analytical scheme where:  
Right A → violation of duty created by A → responsibility → 
remedy  
Privilege B → nonexistent right (no-right) claimed/acted upon by 
non-right holder A as against B → responsibility → remedy  
Power C → liability resisted/denied → responsibility → remedy  
Immunity D → nonexistent power (disability) claimed/acted upon 
as against D → responsibility → remedy  
It would go well beyond the scope of this paper to detail matters any 
further. In the spirit of only laying out the foundations of integrative 
constitutional punishment, the following table may help show what mode 
of legal analysis might lead to the appropriate remedial fine-tuning that 
reconstructed constitutional punishment demands. 
 
Ex ante remedies Violation of 
prisoner right 
Violation of 
prisoner 
privilege 
Violation of 
prisoner 
power 
Violation of 
prisoner 
immunity 
Agent-subjective 
cruelty 
Remedy 1 Remedy 2 Remedy 3 Remedy 4 
Agent-objective 
cruelty 
Remedy 5 Remedy 6 Remedy 7 Remedy 8 
Victim-subjective 
cruelty 
Remedy 9 Remedy 10 Remedy 11 Remedy 12 
Agent-independent, 
victim-objective 
cruelty 
Remedy 13 Remedy 14 Remedy 15 Ex post 
remedies 
 
For example, if we focus on the instances of cruelty described in 
Farmer, it is clear that their adequate remediation would involve a 
combination of retrospective and prospective remedies. Furthermore, those 
remedies would need to be tied to the particular type of cruelty inflicted 
and to the rights, privileges, powers, and immunities into which the 
substance of the Eighth Amendment could be disaggregated in casu.  
The picture that emerges from the analytical distinction of types of 
cruelty and the disaggregation of the fundamental right against cruelty is a 
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complex one. A fitting remedial system would unavoidably be complex 
too,
210
 and at times intrusive.
211
 But the challenge of complexity is more 
than paid off by efficiency and fairness once the branches of government 
adjust to the policy and the equitable measures required by it. Until they 
do so, punishment will not find its proper foundation in liberal democratic 
constitutionalism. 
CONCLUSION 
In his study of the British constitution, A.V. Dicey noted that “[t]he 
proclamation in a constitution or charter of the right to personal freedom, 
or indeed of any other right, gives of itself but slight security that the right 
has more than a nominal existence,” and in order to be assured of the 
actual existence of a right, observers “must consider both what is the 
meaning of the right and, a matter of even more consequence, what are the 
legal methods by which its exercise is secured.”212 It was in such a spirit 
that the reactive doctrine of unconstitutional punishment emerged and 
evolved. I have showed the limitations of this approach. In order to 
reconstruct punishment, this Article sought to combine high theory and 
close attention to the doctrinal ground using examples of American 
constitutional jurisprudence.
213
  
I recognize that reactive punishment doctrine is committed to the 
rejection of cruelty and to the affirmation of human dignity, albeit in 
partial and convoluted ways. The history of the constitutionalization of 
punitive coercion shows, for example, the institutional imprint of the 
rejection of cruelty. This rejection lies at the root of the shift from 
absolutist and totalitarian conceptions of state police power to a 
 
 
 210. The Supreme Court has recognized that “[o]nly a multifaceted approach aimed at many 
causes, including overcrowding, will yield a solution.” Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1937 (2011). 
 211. It is worth noticing that the Supreme Court and the federal judiciary have not shied away 
from intrusion when required by constitutional enforcement. “Courts,” it has recently reaffirmed, “may 
not allow constitutional violations to continue simply because a remedy would involve intrusion into 
the realm of prison administration.” Id. at 1928–29. 
 212. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 124 (Liberty 
Classics 1982). 
 213. As far as I am concerned, jurists have a long-standing and healthy tradition of cannibalizing 
insights and findings produced by scholars working in philosophy and in the natural and social 
sciences. The accusation often leveled from these quarters to the effect that jurists are superficial 
philosophers and amateur social scientists misunderstand both the urgency and complexity of the 
concrete problems for which jurists are called to offer solutions and also overlooks the epistemological 
fact that the mind of the jurist is supposed to accompany law wherever law goes. Contemporary law, 
as we all know, goes everywhere. None of this, though, should be interpreted as claiming there is no 
way to distinguish the good from the poorly done cannibalization of philosophical insights and 
scientific findings. 
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constitutional commitment to curb the will of states to punish.
214
 The 
jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court exemplifies this shift. 
It is, however, puzzling and disturbing that, at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, even liberal constitutional orders—let alone others— 
have yet to take full ownership of punishment as a routine, legitimate 
constitutional practice. Part of the explanation for this failing must be that 
convicts constitute one of the most “discrete and insular” minorities of any 
country.
215
 An overwhelming majority of convicts already find themselves 
(by social and biological accident, by choice, or, most often, by a 
combination of these factors) at the confluence of marginalizing 
circumstances (from race and destitution to undocumented migratory 
status, disability, ghettoization, and poor education) well before they are 
convicted of a crime. 
If this were not enough, the political disenfranchisement, andsocial 
invisibility (or stigmatization as the price of social visibility) of convicts 
have historically rendered them susceptible to political exploitation.
216
 
Time and again, electoral politics has depicted voters as all-too-vulnerable 
potential victims
217
 in calling for ever more radical punitive agendas.
218
 It 
 
 
 214. The claim here is a causal one. The reader might, however, consider the relations among the 
relevant variables to be one of functionality or strong correlation. I believe the cognitive gains in 
adopting functional or correlational explanations in this case would be comparatively small, but still 
significant. For a history of the ancient and medieval origins of police power to its contemporary 
manifestation in criminal law and procedure, see generally MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE POLICE 
POWER: PATRIARCHY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (2005).  
 215. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 (1938). Scholarship on 
footnote Four is abundant. Robert Cover rightly calls attention to the fact that “organized baiting of 
minorities has been one of the levers for manipulating masses since the advent of modern politics. “It 
represents,” Cover concludes, “a failure of politics not only in the nonprotection of the victim group, 
but also in the deflection and perversion of other public purposes.” ROBERT COVER, The Origins of 
Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE 
ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1995). The truth of Cover’s diagnosis is 
perfectly applicable to confined minorities in general. 
 216. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) proves the point. I will return to the 
PLRA infra [This may not be appropriate because this is near the very end of the article—or if it is 
appropriate, there should be a cross reference to where it is returned to infra.]. For now, even cursory 
examination of the statute will show the immense burdens it places on prisoners. Section 1983 civil 
rights litigation. In Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006), that burden was made even heavier by the 
unreasonably pro-defendant interpretation the court provided of the administrative exhaustion of 
remedies clause of PLRA.  
 217. The “prison revolving door” and “Willie Horton” campaign ads of Bush against Dukakis in 
the 1988 presidential election are examples of the practice. 
 218. It is therefore unsurprising that in such a climate, according to the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, 2,299,116 prisoners were held in federal or state prisons or in local jails. William J. Sabol & 
Heather Couture, Prison Inmates at Midyear 2007, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN (June 
2008), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pim07.pdf. Of these, over 11,000 were minors. About 
thirty percent of the total number of individuals held in confinement had allegedly committed drug and 
public-order related offenses. A growing body of literature analyzes this phenomenon. An ambitious 
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is a further complicating factor that criminal justice-related rights in liberal 
constitutions are rarely seen as statements of universal rights. Because 
those rights usually come into force only when the criminal justice 
apparatus singles out an individual suspect from the broader population, 
and because those rights are primarily seen from a remedial angle, 
perceptions are easily manipulated to give the impression that their role is 
to shelter the criminal. No one doubts that the social subset of criminal 
convicts includes the perverse, the cruel, and the violent,
219
 but it also 
enfolds the innocent and poor, the mentally ill and disabled, the abused 
and neglected, the stigmatized and the persecuted. Faced with these social 
and cultural challenges, the doctrines of unconstitutional punishment 
evolved into their present stunted and misshapen form in liberal 
democratic constitutionalism.  
But the historical process that in liberal democratic polities brought 
investigation, prosecution, trial, sentence, and punishment under 
constitutional purview was only partly about controlling the power of the 
state. It was also about the expression of consideration for the humanity of 
the investigated, prosecuted, tried, sentenced, and punished. At stake in 
this process is, ultimately, the very type of legal and political order that 
constitutionalism constitutes and maintains.
220
  
Measured against these aspirations, the current state of unconstitutional 
punishment doctrine is a challenge to our patience and faith in humanity. 
Law, however, cannot indulge in despair, neglect, or oblivion. At its best, 
a society’s legal system is an expression of that society’s hopes for ever 
greater efficacy in producing just outcomes. If we wish to live up to 
common hopes for a just and decent criminal justice system, one that 
liberal democratic constitutions will own as a central element of their 
constitutional architecture, we must take on the task of translating that 
need for just outcomes into doctrinal details and institutional 
 
 
work connecting mass incarceration, electoral politics, and governance is JONATHAN SIMON, 
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 219. Justice Thomas wrote in his concurrence in Farmer v. Brennan, “[p]risons are necessarily 
dangerous places; they house society’s most antisocial and violent people in close proximity with one 
another. Regrettably, some level of brutality and sexual aggression among [prisoners] is inevitable 
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I.L.M 1471, 1484 [1999]. 
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improvements. The failure to do so wrongs not only those directly 
victimized by unconstitutional punishment—it wrongs the whole body 
politic. Reactive constitutional punishment theory has tried to address 
these concerns, and much in that effort has been promising. The best way 
forward, however, is to develop, from the doctrinal elements already 
present in current jurisprudence, a new paradigm for constitutional 
punishment.  
Constitutions, I have reminded the reader, do not ban all manifestations 
of private and public violence. Of all forms of constitutional violence, 
none is more commonly deployed than punishment for criminal offenses. 
Is it ever legitimate, this Article asked? Yes, upon a fivefold principled 
foundation that integrates moral and political theories of constitutional 
punishment at the same time as it integrates reactive and proactive 
doctrinal translations of those principles. 
The five foundational principles of constitutional punishment change 
the normative curvature of the political and moral spaces of punishment. 
They stipulate that constitutional orders must take ownership of 
punishment as coerced vulnerability, that punishment must be conceived 
and practiced as cruelty-free, that dignity must be proactively affirmed 
through rather than simply not violated by punishment, that punishment 
must both meet morally justified penological objectives and to take 
seriously the moral agency of those subject to it, and that punishment that 
fails to do these things must be fully redressable and stand a fair chance of 
being prevented.  
In law, doctrinal mistakes and moral failures mutually reinforce each 
other. This Article has sought to break this link by showing the limits of 
reactive punishment theory and by articulating principles capable of 
sustaining the legitimacy of punishment as a constitutional practice that 
polities may adopt in clear conscience and with eyes wide open. 
Punishment is here to stay. We would do better to take ownership of it on 
sound political and moral foundations. Doing so would make us all safer. 
More importantly for the liberal democratic experience of self-
government, doing so means that we would not need to ask the moral 
conscience of the people to look the other way when their states punish. 
 
